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 INDEPENDENT EMPLOYEES: A NEW CATEGORY OF WORKERS 
FOR THE GIG ECONOMY  
Michael L. Nadler* 
Many companies, particularly in the Gig Economy, have been 
the target of lawsuits alleging that they have misclassified workers 
as independent contractors rather than employees. These issues 
often present bet-the-company litigation, with billions of dollars and 
the companies’ very business models at stake. Although there is 
near-universal recognition that the division of workers into two 
rigid categories creates a host of problems because it is based on 
antiquated notions that fail to map cleanly onto the modern 
economy, legal scholarship to date has failed to adequately grapple 
with the existing employment case-law to propose a new way 
forward. This Article does so by exploring the history of both the 
Gig Economy and the contractor-employee bifurcation, drawing on 
insights from their intersection to propose a new test for properly 
categorizing workers. In doing so, it outlines the contours of an 
intermediate category of worker, the “independent employee.” 
Although many have suggested that a new category of worker would 
be beneficial, they have generally failed to explain what such a 
category would look like in practice. This Article fills that void by 
providing a functional framework for both how to identify 
independent employees and determining the legal protections and 
benefits that they should be granted. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Unicorns are now ubiquitous.”1 Indeed, it has become cliché to 
note the once-astonishing success of nascent technology companies 
that are creating new opportunities for individuals to offer goods and 
services directly to others on a previously unimaginable scale. One 
of the defining characteristics of these companies is that they operate 
in interstitial areas of the law because they present new and unique 
challenges that were not foreseen—and are not accounted for—by 
existing laws and regulations.2 And like moths to a flame, a spate of 
lawsuits has followed their success in light of the legal ambiguities 
these companies present, some of which may have the capacity to 
permanently derail or destroy their burgeoning business models.3 
                                                
 1 Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure and the New Private 
Economy, 57 B.C. L. REV. 583, 587 (2016) (defining “unicorns” as companies 
with billion-dollar valuations and noting “the increasing pace at which unicorns 
are anointed” in recent years). 
 2 Roberta A. Kaplan & Michael L. Nadler, Airbnb: A Case Study in Occupancy 
Regulation and Taxation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 103, 104 (2015). 
 3 See, e.g., Sarah Kessler, The Gig Economy Won’t Last Because It’s Being 
Sued to Death, FAST CO. (Feb. 17, 2015), https://www.fastcompany.com 
/3042248/the-gig-economy-wont-last-because-its-being-sued-to-death 
(describing employment lawsuits as “a huge threat to the gig economy” and 
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In particular, this Article discusses complaints lodged against 
several companies that operate in the Gig Economy,4 alleging that 
                                                
arguing that if gig economy companies cannot classify workers as independent 
contractors, “you lose the gig economy.”). 
 4 This Article uses the term “Gig Economy” specifically because many of the 
terms used to encompass these various technology companies mask important 
distinctions among their business models. Because they share “common core 
ideas that explain the[ir] overlap” but have fundamentally different meanings, 
discussions that fail to define their terms quickly get muddy as the varying 
definitions are “bent out of shape to suit different purposes.” Rachel Botsman, 
The Sharing Economy Lacks a Shared Definition, FAST CO. (Nov. 21, 2013), 
https://www.fastcompany.com/3022028/the-sharing-economy-lacks-a-shared-
definition; see also Ian Brinkley, Ditch Your Assumptions About Uber and 
Airbnb: the ‘Gig Economy’ is No Game Changer, GUARDIAN (Aug. 19, 2015, 
5:37 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2015/aug/19/gig-
economy-no-game-changer-impact-uber-airbnb; Denise Fung Cheng, Reading 
Between the Lines: Blueprints for a Worker Support Infrastructure in the Peer 
Economy (June 2014) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology), http://cmsw.mit.edu/wp/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/232902196-
Denise-Cheng-Reading-Between-the-Lines-Blueprints-for-a-Worker-Support-
Infrastructure-in-the-Peer-Economy.pdf. Some companies, such as Airbnb or 
ZipCar, can be described as belonging to a new Sharing Economy, which enables 
the collaborative consumption of physical assets, such as homes and automobiles, 
that are expensive to purchase but often sit idle and underutilized by their owners. 
In other words, their business model relies on the sharing of physical assets’ 
unused capacity. See John J. Horton & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Owning, Using and 
Renting: Some Simple Economics of the “Sharing Economy” (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22029, 2016), http://john-joseph-
horton.com/papers/sharing.pdf. Other companies, such as TaskRabbit or 
KitchenSurfing, are better classified as belonging to a new Gig Economy, in 
which professionals primarily offer their available time and labor to perform a 
variety of services. See Rachel Botsman, The Sharing Economy: Dictionary of 
Commonly Used Terms, MEDIUM (Oct. 19, 2015), https://medium.com 
/@rachelbotsman/the-sharing-economy-dictionary-of-commonly-used-terms-
d1a696691d12 (defining “Gig Economy” as embracing “[s]ystems that break up 
a traditional company ‘job’ into individual ‘gigs’ that independent workers are 
paid to do for a defined time.”). As one commentator has acerbically but astutely 
explained, if Gig Economy workers were to be classified as part of the Sharing 
Economy, then the same would necessarily be true for all other workers because 
the companies’ business models “don’t involve ‘sharing’ anything other than 
labor.” Christopher Mims, How Everyone Gets the ‘Sharing’ Economy Wrong, 
WALL ST. J. (May 24, 2015, 3:32 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-
everyone-gets-the-sharing-economy-wrong-1432495921; see also, e.g., Erez 
Aloni, Pluralizing the “Sharing” Economy, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1397, 1407 (2016) 
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these companies have misappropriated vast sums of money from 
their workers by improperly classifying them as independent 
contractors, rather than as employees.5 Claims of worker 
misclassification have plagued the Gig Economy because they call 
into question the very nature of the services provided by, and to, its 
participants. These matters bring to the forefront a core issue at the 
heart of the Gig Economy’s identity: Do these companies truly 
create more efficient markets by functioning as platforms for 
matchmaking among independent commercial actors,6 or do they 
instead engage in regulatory arbitrage to obtain a competitive 
advantage while actually functioning no differently than traditional 
employers?7 
                                                
(“In fact, ‘sharing’ and kindred designations are misnomers. Even if there are 
some altruistic or communal motives . . . , the heart of the industry is financial 
gain . . . . Consumers pay for the services and goods, and providers enjoy an 
additional, or main, source of income. All types of transactions are monetized.”). 
 5 See, e.g., Singer v. Postmates, Inc., No. 15 Civ. 1284 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 1, 2017); 
Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., No. 13 Civ. 4065 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2016); O’Connor v. Uber 
Techs., Inc., No. 13 Civ. 3826 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2015); Levin v. Caviar, Inc., No. 
15 Civ. 1285 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2015); Cobarruviaz v. Maplebear Inc., No. 15 
Civ. 697 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2015); Iglecias v. Homejoy, No. 15 Civ. 1286 (N.D. 
Cal. Sep. 29, 2015); Otey v. Crowdflower, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 5524 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 
2, 2015); Taranto v. Washio, Inc., No. CGC-15-546584 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 29, 
2015); Yucesoy v. Uber Techs. Inc., No. 15 Civ. 262 (N.D. Cal. June 12, 2015). 
 6 See, e.g., Abbey Stemler, Betwixt and Between: Regulating the Shared 
Economy, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 31, 32 (2016) (“The platforms in the sharing 
economy use technology to connect people who have private excess capacity to 
those who want to purchase it.”); Julia Tomassetti, Does Uber Redefine the Firm? 
The Postindustrial Corporation and Advanced Information Technology, 34 
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 14–15 (2016) (defining the “Uber narrative” as the 
assertion that it “use[s] technology to facilitate a market between independent 
sellers and buyers”). 
 7 Noah D. Zatz, Does Work Law Have a Future if the Labor Market Does Not?, 
91 CHI. KENT. L. REV. 1081, 1093 (2016); see also Benjamin Means & Joseph 
Steiner, Navigating the Uber Economy, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1511, 1514 n.7 
(2016) (“[I]f companies like Uber gain a competitive advantage in the 
marketplace by shirking their obligations to workers, then their perceived luster 
might owe something to regulatory arbitrage rather than useful innovation.”). An 
argument can also be made that a better analogy is that the platforms function like 
electronic hiring halls. See Sanjukta M. Paul, Uber as For-Profit Hiring Hall: A 
Price-Fixing Paradox and Its Implications, 38 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 233, 
252 (2017) (“Uber purports to perform exactly the same functions as a hiring hall: 
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To be clear, worker misclassification problems are by no means 
limited to the Gig Economy.8 This Article focuses on the Gig 
Economy because it exemplifies broader problems that have long 
been apparent throughout contemporary labor markets. Indeed, our 
traditional tests for determining employment status are notoriously 
indecisive in many contexts. The current legal regime offers a way 
to think about the nature of employment by identifying pertinent 
considerations, but it often fails to provide clear resolution for 
particular conflicts because it does not dictate how myriad factors 
are to be added up and weighed against one another. As Judge Frank 
Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has explained, 
“[a] score of 5 to 3 decides a baseball game, but [employment] 
regulation does not work that way.”9 Accordingly, companies both 
new and old struggle to apply imprecise and outdated tests that do 
not fit the modern workforce, with little ability to anticipate whether 
courts will ratify their decisions or find fundamental flaws with their 
business models. 
One oft-mentioned solution to this dilemma is to create a third 
category of workers that would be more suitable for participants in 
the modern economy, but there are few models for what such an 
outcome might look like. As a result, “[w]hile a third classification 
sounds progressive, nobody’s really sure what it would mean in 
practice.”10 This Article is the first to engage with the existing 
worker-misclassification case-law to outline a new category, the 
“independent employee,” which would resolve many of the flaws 
inherent in our binary division of workers as either employees or 
independent contractors. As set forth below, the recognition of 
independent employees would offer significant advantages over the 
status quo to both companies and workers alike. Moreover, by 
                                                
it brings together buyers and sellers in time and space, and it also sets the price of 
the ride. Just as importantly, it insists that it does nothing else: it does not hire the 
driver itself, and it does not sell rides.” (emphasis in original)). 
 8 Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 135–36 (2016). 
 9 Reyes v. Remington Hybrid Seed Co., Inc., 495 F.3d 403, 407 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 10 Caroline O’Donovan, What a New Class of Worker Could Mean for the 
Future of Labor, BUZZFEED (June 18, 2015, 5:01 PM), 
https://www.buzzfeed.com/carolineodonovan/meet-the-new-worker-same-as-
the-old-worker. 
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eschewing the proliferation of multi-factor tests that frequently 
provide minimal guidance as to how any particular misclassification 
dispute will or should be resolved, this Article offers a system that 
would provide greater clarity and uniformity for deciding a wide 
array of employment litigation.11 
The remainder of this Article will proceed in four parts. Part II 
will discuss the rise of the Gig Economy. Part III will describe the 
current legal regime, which problematically forces workers to be 
classified as either employees or independent contractors. Part IV 
will examine several worker misclassification cases involving the 
Gig Economy, which highlight many of the issues faced by 
companies whose workers straddle the traditional divide between 
employees and independent contractors. Lastly, Part V will propose 
a legislative solution to the current legal regime’s inability to 
predictably and clearly categorize Gig Economy workers.  
II. THE RISE OF THE GIG ECONOMY 
During the Industrial Revolution, entrepreneurs discovered that 
it was often cheaper and more efficient to bring large numbers of 
workers together in firms in order to produce ever-increasing 
quantities of identical goods by dividing labor into manageable units 
arranged around uniform systems and processes.12 While this may 
have limited the number of bespoke and artisanal products offered, 
mass-production provided a windfall to consumers seeking 
consistent and affordable goods and services.13 For workers, 
meanwhile, the rise of firms would eventually provide stable and 
                                                
 11 The term “employment” and references to “employment law” throughout are 
meant to refer to the traditional distinction drawn between “employment law, 
which offers ‘rights and protections to employees on an individual—and 
individually enforceable—basis,’” as opposed to “labor law, which aims to 
protect collective action among workers.” Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 
YALE L.J. 2, 37 (2016) (quoting James Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and 
the Law of the Workplace, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1563, 1570 (1996)). They are not 
meant to suggest that Gig Economy workers are properly classified as employees. 
 12 See There’s an App for That, ECONOMIST (Dec. 30, 2014), 
https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21637355-freelance-workers-
available-moments-notice-will-reshape-nature-companies-and. 
 13 See id. 
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dependable sources of income upon which they could rely.14 Thus 
was born the ideal of “organization men,” employees who would 
remain loyal to a single long-term employer over the course of their 
careers, a concept around which many twentieth-century 
government programs and social welfare policies were based.15 
For decades, this arrangement proved mutually beneficial. 
“Organization men exchanged years of service for defined benefits: 
steady pay, a pension, health benefits, guaranteed safety conditions 
and more. Underpinning these organization men’s allegiance was 
the belief that their firm would take care of them.”16 Indeed, many 
scholars have argued that the high degree to which employees 
identified with their employers and adopted their employers’ goals 
as their own were among the primary factors in the United States’ 
post-World War II economic growth because this alignment 
produced several beneficial effects: (1) loyal workers did not 
demand excessive compensation; (2) they were unlikely to game 
their employer’s internal structures and processes to advance their 
own interests at their employers’ expense; and (3) they could be 
counted on to make discretionary judgments that benefitted the 
company rather than just themselves.17 Decades before business 
executives learned to rely on the mantras of “other people’s 
                                                
 14 See id. 
 15 See id. See generally WILLIAM H. WHYTE, THE ORGANIZATION MAN (1956). 
 16 Cheng, supra note 4, at 17; see also, e.g., RICK WARTZMAN, THE END OF 
LOYALTY 263 (2017) (paraphrasing the president of Coca-Cola’s speech in 1959 
as stating that “a corporation has to serve four constituencies: the stockholder, the 
community, the customer, and the employee.”); DON HELLRIEGEL & JOHN 
SLOCUM, JR., ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 82 (2d ed. 1979) (explaining that in 
the 1950s General Electric’s stated goals included “provid[ing] good jobs, wages, 
working conditions, work satisfactions, stability of employment, and 
opportunities for advancement for employees, in return for their loyalty, initiative, 
skill, care, effort, attendance and teamwork”). 
 17 See June Carbone & Nancy Levit, The Death of the Firm, 101 MINN. L. REV. 
963, 975–81 (2017) (summarizing scholarship regarding the advantages of the 
firm); see also id. at 990 (“corporate managers embraced the corporate brand and 
saw their role as one of stewardship of the institution . . . . The individual gained 
personal status through identification with the firm and saw the firm’s well-being 
as intimately linked with personal advancement.”). 
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money”18 and “I’ll be gone, you’ll be gone,”19 the prospect of a 
lengthy career with a single employer allowed corporate officers to 
link their personal success and self-esteem more closely with the 
health and prestige of their employer rather than with their 
individual salary or net worth.20 
In retrospect, cracks in this façade began appearing as early as 
the 1970s. In that era, companies began heeding the advice of 
investors and management experts instructing them to cut costs and 
focus on their core competencies, selling off secondary or tertiary 
business lines and outsourcing back-office responsibilities.21 
Scholars in a variety of fields concurrently offered theoretical 
justification for these practices as necessary in order to provide 
maximum value to companies’ shareholders at the expense of the 
                                                
 18 See, e.g., Louis Nelson, Trump: ‘There’s Nothing Like Doing Things with 
Other People’s Money’, POLITICO (Sept. 20, 2016, 6:04 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/09/donald-trump-other-peoples-money-
228434 (“It’s called OPM. I do that all the time in business. It’s called other 
people’s money. There’s nothing like doing things with other people’s money.”); 
William D. Cohan, When Bankers Started Playing with Other People’s Money, 
ATLANTIC, (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive 
/2017/02/how-wall-street-went-public/517419 (Starting in the 1970s, “bankers 
and traders were being rewarded to take outsized risks with other people’s money 
and with very little financial accountability when things went wrong. . . .” 
(emphasis in original)). 
 19 See, e.g., James Surowiecki, Punish the Executives, Not Just the Banks, NEW 
YORKER (July 15, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/punish-
the-executives-not-just-the-banks (discussing “the basic logic behind what they 
called ‘I’ll be gone, you’ll be gone’” in which “people were willing to do deals 
that they knew were likely to blow up, because they figured that by time the deals 
went bad, they themselves would have moved on (while pocketing hefty bonuses 
in the meantime)”); Lynn Stuart Parramore, Big Finance Is Strangling Innovation, 
SALON (July 27, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://www.salon.com/2013/07/27 
/big_finance_is_sucking_the_life_out_of_our_economy_partner/ (summarizing 
this motto to mean that “[a]s long as you’re making money right now, what 
happens tomorrow is not your problem”). 
 20 See Carbone & Levit, supra note 17, at 980. 
 21 See Noam Scheiber, Growth in the ‘Gig Economy’ Fuels Work Force 
Anxieties, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/13 
/business/rising-economic-insecurity-tied-to-decades-long-trend-in-
employment-practices.html. 
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companies’ other stakeholders, including their employees.22 This 
process accelerated drastically in subsequent decades, as 
technological innovations made it far easier for companies to 
contract with external vendors for many services and discrete 
projects, turning streamlined efficiency and profit-maximization 
into familiar and well-worn ideals pursued throughout corporate 
America.23 These trends soon dovetailed with the cultural focus on 
individual responsibility and accountability that accompanied the 
“Reagan Revolution.”24 The dominant sentiment of this era was 
succinctly expressed by a General Electric human resources 
executive who exhorted employees to “do good work, work hard, 
and always have a copy of your resume ready” because, “as a 
society, we’re going to be moving away from the things that tie 
people to a company for thirty years.”25 Put another way by the same 
company’s legendary CEO, “Neutron Jack” Welch, “Only satisfied 
customers can give people job security. Not companies.”26 
The long-lasting impact of these cultural shifts is still being felt 
today. The continued focus on maximizing shareholder profit, to the 
                                                
 22 See, e.g., Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to 
Increase Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, (describing arguments that 
businesses have a “responsibilit[y] for providing employment” as “pure and 
unadulterated socialism” because “there is one and only one social responsibility 
of business—to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its 
profits”). See generally Carbone & Levit, supra note 17, at 995–99 (describing 
advocacy for companies to “bring back the price mechanism” and “reduce the 
entity to no more than a vehicle to facilitate market exchanges” as academia’s 
“assault on the firm”). 
 23 See Charles Lawton, The 1980s Decimated Stable U.S. Corporate Model and 
Workers Must Deal with Fallout, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Jan. 19, 2016), 
http://www.pressherald.com/2016/01/19/charles-lawton-the-1980s-decimated-
the-stable-u-s-corporate-model; Scheiber, supra note 22; Cheng, supra note 4, at 
19. 
 24 See, e.g., Andrias, supra note 11, at 22–23 (referencing President Reagan’s 
fight against air traffic controllers as a factor in restructuring the American 
economy into a form “almost unrecognizable from the one that defined the New 
Deal”). 
 25 WARTZMAN, supra note 16, at 248–49. 
 26 Id. at 242. The media referred to Welch as “Neutron Jack,” a sobriquet to 
which he took offense, because it conveyed that his management policies were 
like a neutron bomb: they left buildings and machinery intact but eliminated the 
employees. Id. at 241. 
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exclusion of all other interests, was amply demonstrated by Wall 
Street’s outrage at American Airlines’ recent agreement to raise 
wages, prompting financial analysts to complain that the company 
was prioritizing employees over shareholders.27 Although “modern 
corporate law does not require for-profit corporations to pursue 
profit at the expense of everything else,”28 the notion that companies 
might act in their employees’ interests rather than that of their 
shareholders—or that shareholders might even benefit from 
improving corporate morale and attracting higher-quality 
employees through increased wages—was scarcely heard.29 
Of course, loyalty in employment relationships is reciprocal. 
Employees’ allegiance to their employers was premised on the 
companies’ commitments to them in the form of benefits, training, 
opportunities for promotion, and a secure tenure with the firm.30 The 
predictable reaction to employers renouncing the notion that they 
owed any non-contractual duties to their employees was a 
concomitant desire by many employees to leave behind stultifying 
corporate environs for more flexible and personally rewarding 
approaches to work through combinations of entrepreneurship, self-
employment, and freelancing.31 Indeed, a recent survey of Uber 
                                                
 27 See, e.g., American Airlines Announces Pay Raises, and Investors Balk, L.A. 
TIMES (Apr. 27, 2017, 1:45 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-
american-airlines-raises-20170427-story.html (quoting analyst: “This is 
frustrating. Labor is being paid first again. Shareholders get leftovers.”); Tomi 
Kilgore, American Airlines Downgraded as Pay Raises Set ‘Worrying Precedent’, 
FOX BUS. (Apr. 27, 2017), http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2017/04/27 
/american-airlines-downgraded-as-pay-raises-set-worrying-precedent.html 
(quoting analyst: “We are troubled by [American Airlines’] wealth transfer of 
nearly $1 billion to its labor groups.”). 
 28 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014). 
 29 Cf. Dieter Sadowski, Joachim Junkes & Sabine Lindenthal, The German 
Model of Corporate and Labor Governance, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 33, 37 
(2000) (discussing the German Co-Determination Act of 1976, which required 
that German stock corporations’ and limited liability companies’ supervisory 
boards have “quasi-parity representation of shareholders and employees,” in 
which the employees’ board representation “must include at least one blue- and 
one white-collar worker, one managerial employee and two trade unionists”). 
 30 Carbone & Levit, supra note 17, at 990–91. 
 31 Tim Barker, Piecing Together a Living Through the Gig Economy, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH: BUS. (Sept. 6, 2015), http://www.stltoday.com/business/local/piecing-
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drivers reflects the deterioration of the employer-employee social 
contract over the course of several decades: when asked if they 
would prefer “a steady 9-to-5 job with some benefits and a set salary 
or a job where you choose your own schedule and be your own 
boss,” 73% of Uber drivers rejected the “steady 9-to-5 job” in favor 
of striking out on their own.32 
As Professors June Carbone and Nancy Levit have persuasively 
argued, the result of these trends has been the death of the business 
models that dominated the post-war era.33 Modern companies prize 
efficiency and flexibility, organizing themselves around specialized 
business functions that are often supported by a rotating cast of 
service-sector firms and independent contractors, such that today’s 
large companies no longer need labor forces as large as those of their 
predecessors.34 On the other hand, modern-day workers have 
minimal loyalty to their employers, “nor should they,” Carbone and 
Levit argue, “when they have become fungible commodities and 
their employers have become transitory.”35 The result is that the 
employment relationship itself has entered into a self-sustaining 
cycle of decay. Firms invest less in their workers, providing fewer 
benefits and offering less job security, because they can no longer 
rely on their workers’ loyalty, reducing their returns on any such 
investments.36 In turn, even highly trained workers whose skills are 
in great demand increasingly view their career trajectory less in 
terms of climbing the corporate ladder within a given company and 
more in terms of maximizing their human capital, making 
themselves more marketable throughout their industry or profession 
by acquiring desirable skills and experiences.37 As for less skilled 
                                                
together-a-living-through-the-gig-economy/article_e8d13d97-333d-561a-97f7-
0233afcb01f2.html; Scheiber, supra note 21. 
 32 Jonathan Hall & Alan Krueger, An Analysis of the Labor Market for Uber’s 
Driver-Partners in the United States 11 (Princeton Univ., Working Paper No. 587, 
2015), https://irs.princeton.edu/sites/irs/files/An%20Analysis%20of%20the
%20Labor%20Market%20for%20Uber’s%20Driver-Partners%20in%20the
%20United%20States%20587.pdf. 
 33 See generally Carbone & Levit, supra note 17, at 1007–15. 
 34 Id. at 1008. 
 35 Id. at 1009. 
 36 Id. at 1010. 
 37 Id. at 1014. 
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workers, companies appear to have concluded that the services they 
provide can be easily obtained on the open market.38 
The genius of the Gig Economy was to take advantage of these 
long-term trends and tie them to recent technological advances, 
including, in particular, the surging popularity of smart-phone 
applications.39 The advent of pocket-sized computers with GPS, 
wireless Internet access, and the ability to run complex algorithms 
connecting individual users to one another has enabled a new breed 
of companies that serve as intermediaries between their users, 
offering “platforms” or “virtual marketplaces” that connect those in 
need of specific services with those offering them.40 In addition to 
connecting service-consumers and service-providers, many of these 
platform companies also provide two key features: payment 
processing and dynamic reputational ratings systems.41 By doing so, 
platforms help provide the security and information necessary to 
allow complete strangers to conduct business with one another 
“sight unseen.”42 Although imperfect, the widespread embrace of 
dynamic reputational ratings demonstrates that they have proven an 
effective and popular means of policing the quality of internet-based 
transactions by minimizing problems of information asymmetry.43 
                                                
 38 See generally id. at 1011 (“If we compare skilled and unskilled workers, firms 
today contract out . . . to secure an increasing percentage of the unskilled labor 
they need.”). 
 39 See Orly Lobel, The Gig Economy & The Future of Employment and Labor 
Law, 51 U.S.F. L. REV. 51, 56 (2017) (arguing that “[t]he rise of the contingent 
workforce precedes the rise of the platform” and problems related thereto “are not 
unique to the digital platform”). 
 40 Nestor Davidson & John Infranca, The Sharing Economy as an Urban 
Phenomenon, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 215, 231 (2016) (noting that “peer-to-
peer platforms . . . enable individuals to share goods and services by facilitating 
improved matching,” which works best where buyers and sellers are 
geographically close to one another and transact for homogenous goods or 
services). 
 41 Michele Finck & Sofia Ranchordas, Sharing and the City, 49 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1299, 1311 (2016) (noting that these features “reduce the natural 
uncertainty and lack of trust that exist when two strangers interact”). 
 42 Deepa Das Acevedo, Regulating Employment Relationships in the Sharing 
Economy, 20 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 1, 10 (2016). 
 43 See Benjamin Edelman & Damien Geradin, Efficiencies & Regulatory 
Shortcuts: How Should We Regulate Companies Like Airbnb and Uber?, 19 
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To take the largest and most well-known Gig Economy 
company as an example, Uber does not provide a fleet of vehicles to 
transport goods or riders from Point A to Point B for prearranged 
trips.44 Instead, in its own words, Uber provides a platform that 
enables individuals “to arrange and schedule transportation, 
logistics and/or delivery services . . . with third party providers of 
such services.”45 While those seeking a ride via Uber’s platform 
would once have had to step into the street in the hopes of hailing a 
passing taxi or call a car-service to dispatch the next available driver 
from those on its roster, Uber allows both drivers and riders to locate 
one another in real-time via their phones and determine whether they 
would like to contract with one another based on their respective 
crowd-sourced ratings. For riders, this avoids the inconveniences of 
having to wait until a car-service driver is available or relying on 
their luck in attempting to flag down a passing taxi. Meanwhile, 
drivers avoid the delay of having to wait for their next incoming call 
from a dispatcher or missing out on fares because they happen to be 
on the wrong street at the wrong time. Uber’s rapid growth and 
commercial success are ample evidence of the utility this provides 
to both drivers and riders: it is likely the fastest-growing start-up in 
history, having achieved an eleven-figure valuation and expanded to 
more than one million active users in hundreds of cities around the 
                                                
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 293, 316–17 (2016) (questioning “how well ratings actually 
work” but concluding “on the whole” that “ratings systems are probably more 
effective than a quality minimum with purported centralized enforcement”); 
Lobel, supra note 8, at 152–56 (arguing that rating systems are better at quality 
control than traditional forms of regulation); Stemler, supra note 6, at 37–38 
(discussing the history of the “feedback loop system of ratings and reviews”). 
 44 See, e.g., Hamish McRae, Facebook, Airbnb, Uber, and the Unstoppable Rise 
of the Content Non-Generators, INDEP. (May 5, 2015, 18:11 BST), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/comment/hamish-mcrae/facebook-
airbnb-uber-and-the-unstoppable-rise-of-the-content-non-generators-
10227207.html. 
 45 Terms and Conditions, UBER, https://www.uber.com/legal/usa/terms (last 
updated Dec. 13, 2017); see also, e.g., Terms of Service, LYFT, 
https://www.lyft.com/terms (last updated Feb. 6, 2018) (“The Lyft Platform 
provides a marketplace where persons who seek transportation to certain 
destinations . . . can be matched up with persons driving to or through those 
destinations.”). 
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globe within five years of its founding.46 Indeed, despite numerous 
run-ins with legislators and regulators, some argue that Uber’s 
remarkable consumer popularity suggests that it has become “too 
big to ban” in light of the political price faced by government 
officials who have tried to slow or stop its growth.47 
Economists have long understood that companies exist because 
it is often more efficient for an employer to have employees perform 
certain services in order to avoid the transaction costs that the 
employer would otherwise incur if it were forced to repeatedly enter 
the market and negotiate arms-length agreements with third-parties 
offering those same services.48 In other words, as Ronald Coase 
explained in his seminal work, The Nature of the Firm, “the 
operation of a market costs something and by forming an 
organization and allowing some authority . . . to direct the resources, 
certain marketing costs are saved.”49 According to Coase, the 
“dominant characteristic” that separates employees from 
independent contractors is the company’s “right of control or 
interference,” in that an employer is entitled to tell employees “when 
to work . . . and when not to work, and what work to do and how to 
do it.”50 By repeatedly returning to the same pool of employees with 
whom they already have a relationship, employers can avoid the 
costs involved in searching for and evaluating potential 
counterparties for every transaction, negotiating terms and coming 
to an agreement regarding the proposed transaction, and monitoring 
their counterparties to ensure that their agreement is carried out 
according to its terms.51 
The converse of this central insight, however, is that hiring full-
time employees may not always be the most efficient system for 
                                                
 46 See Max Chafkin, What Makes Uber Run, FAST CO. (Sep. 8, 2015), 
https://www.fastcompany.com/3050250/what-makes-uber-run. 
 47 Stemler, supra note 6, at 70 (quoting Marcus Wohlsen, Uber’s Brilliant 
Strategy to Make Itself Too Big to Ban, WIRED (July 8, 2014, 6:30 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/2014/07/ubers-brilliant-strategy-to-make-itself-too-big-
to-ban). 
 48 See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 392 (1937). 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 404. 
 51 Lobel, supra note 8, at 106. 
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arranging services. Rather, as Coase recognized, “a point may be 
reached where the costs of organizing an extra transaction within the 
firm are equal to the costs involved in carrying out the transaction 
in the open market.”52 Taken to its logical conclusion, this suggests 
companies will rely on unaffiliated third-parties to perform specific 
tasks when doing so is cheaper and more efficient than hiring 
employees.53 By using modern technology to create virtual 
marketplaces that allow service-providers and service-consumers to 
connect directly with one another with minimal transaction costs, 
Gig Economy companies have unlocked a latent market for goods 
and services that could not have functioned in a world of higher 
transaction costs. Doing so has facilitated the outsourcing of work 
that previously might have been given to employees, demonstrating 
just how prescient Coase was. After all, how many micro-
entrepreneurs would have gone into business for themselves absent 
the rise of platforms?54 
In addition to easing logistical burdens, Gig Economy 
companies provide several other benefits to their users. Among the 
most frequently cited reasons for embracing the Gig Economy is the 
flexibility it offers to service-providers, who are not generally 
required to work any set number of hours or according to a pre-
determined schedule, allowing them to choose where and when they 
will work entirely of their own volition.55 Indeed, a study of several 
hundred drivers who use Uber’s platform in cities throughout the 
United States found that 87% of drivers listed among their reasons 
for doing so the opportunity “to be [their] own boss and set [their] 
own schedule,” while 85% cited the opportunity “to have more 
flexibility in [their] schedule and balance [their] work with [their] 
                                                
 52 Coase, supra note 48, at 394; see also Jaclyn Kurin, A Third Way for Applying 
U.S. Labor Laws to the Online Gig Economy: Using the Franchise Business 
Model to Regulate Gig Workers, 12 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 193 (2017). 
 53 See Coase, supra note 48, at 394. 
 54 See Botsman, The Sharing Economy: Dictionary of Commonly Used Terms, 
supra note 4 (defining “Micro-entrepreneurs” as “[P]eople who are empowered 
to make or save money by offering their existing assets, or services to other 
people.”); Lobel, supra note 8, at 106–07. 
 55 See Barker, supra note 31; Cheng, supra note 4, at 25; Hall & Krueger, supra 
note 32, at 2. 
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life and family.”56 In addition, many Gig Economy workers believe 
that it allows them to make more money than they would otherwise 
earn in traditional jobs57 while avoiding the perils of freelancing, 
such as customers who pay late or try to avoid paying at all.58 
Moreover, while it might be expected that the provision of services 
via Gig Economy companies would lead to an increase in consumer 
welfare, recent research suggests that, perhaps counter-intuitively, 
the majority of benefits accrue to lower-income consumers.59 And 
from the government’s perspective, the rise of the Gig Economy 
promises to create accurate records of a vast array of economic 
activity that historically was often conducted in the shadows and off 
the books.60 As will be discussed further below, however, the advent 
of the Gig Economy has not been without its difficulties. 
III. THE EMPLOYEE-CONTRACTOR DIVIDE 
Like all companies, members of the Gig Economy have been 
forced to choose whether to classify workers using their platforms 
as either employees or independent contractors. This distinction is 
far from academic, as the protections granted by a wide array of 
statutes apply only to employees. At the federal level, for example, 
independent contractors are not covered by the Fair Labor Standards 
Act’s wage guarantees, the National Labor Relations Act’s 
                                                
 56 Hall & Krueger, supra note 32, at 11. 
 57 Id.; Cheng, supra note 4, at 90. 
 58 See There’s an App for That, supra note 12 (“Potential freelancers, for their 
part, do not want to have to deal with deadbeats: about 40% of freelancers are 
currently paid late.”); Lydia DePillis, For Freelancers, Getting Stiffed Is Part of 
the Job. Some in New York City Want to Fix It., WASH. POST. WONKBLOG (Dec. 
7, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/12/07/for-
freelancers-getting-stiffed-is-part-of-the-job-some-in-new-york-city-want-to-fix-
it. 
 59 See Samuel Fraiberger & Arun Sundarajan, Peer-to-Peer Rental Markets in 
the Sharing Economy (N.Y. Univ. Stern Sch. of Bus. 2015). 
 60 Lobel, supra note 8, at 125 (“[P]latform companies can become regulatory 
facilitators using their technological capacities to collect, as well as provide 
audited evidence of compliance in the era of decentralized peer-to-peer 
transactions.”); Shu-Yi Oei & Diane Ring, Can Sharing Be Taxed, 93 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 989, 1053 (2016) (“[B]ecause many sharing workers may be relatively 
new to reporting business income and expenses, they . . . may ignore or understate 
income earned or track expenses inadequately.”). 
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protections for organizing and collective action, the Civil Rights 
Act’s anti-discrimination provisions, the Family Medical Leave 
Act’s guarantees of job-protected leave upon the occurrence of 
certain enumerated personal events, or the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act’s rules concerning workplace safety.61 The burden of 
hiring an employee instead of an independent contractor is 
considerable, with estimates ranging as high as a 40% cost 
differential in light of the various benefits and protections afforded 
to employees.62 
It is no coincidence that much of the aforementioned legislation 
was enacted prior to the 1980s, when large corporations played a 
very different role in American society than they do today.63 The 
employee-contractor divide is derived from nineteenth-century 
common law that sought to determine when a master should be held 
liable for the tortious injuries caused by his servant—vocabulary 
that itself demonstrates just how antiquated these concepts are.64 
Congress codified this distinction in the early twentieth-century as 
it sought to define the coverage of New Deal statutes meant to 
                                                
 61 See, e.g., Nicholas L. DeBruyne, Uber Drivers: A Disputed Employment 
Relationship in Light of the Sharing Economy, 92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 289, 290 
(2017); Alek Felstiner, Working the Crowd: Employment and Labor Law in the 
Crowdsourcing Industry, 32 BERKELEY J. OF EMP. & LAB. L. 143, 170 (2011). 
 62 Catherine Clifford, Why a $14/Hour Employee Costs $20, CNN (Mar. 26, 
2010, 9: 52 AM ET), http://money.cnn.com/2010/03/26/smallbusiness
/employee_costs/ (explaining that an employee’s “so-called ‘loaded rate’ includes 
fixed expenses—federal and state taxes, health insurance, workman’s 
compensation, uniforms, and paid time off—along with soft costs like the time 
spent training a new hire,” such that their “true cost” can be “about 40% more 
than base pay”); see also Robert Wood, If 30% of Pay is Benefits, What About 
Independent Contractors, FORBES, (Aug. 14, 2013, 2:20 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2013/08/14/if-30-of-pay-is-benefits-
what-about-independent-contractors/#7b278fc57931 (“Figures vary materially, 
but benefits in some cases can amount to a whopping 30% of pay.”). 
 63 See Carbone & Levit, supra note 17, at 1017; Caleb Holloway, Keeping 
Freedom in Freelance: It’s Time for Gig Firms and Gig Workers to Update Their 
Relationship Status, 16 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 298, 308 
(2016). 
 64 See Holloway, supra note 63, at 307; Robert Redfearn III, Sharing Economy 
Misclassification: Employees and Independent Contractors in Transportation 
Network Companies, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1023, 1029–30 (2016). 
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protect and provide rights to certain workers.65 The historical 
justification for exempting independent contractors from the 
protections provided to employees is that independent contractors 
were thought to have greater bargaining power than employees, as 
they were typically highly skilled workers who commanded 
premium wages on the open market and could provide their services 
to many customers on a project-by-project basis, rather than being 
tied to a single employer.66 Statutes that were subsequently drafted 
to benefit workers have dramatically increased the consequences of 
this categorization. Modern law places far more import on 
employment status than the common-law test from which the 
employee-contractor bifurcation was derived.67 
Unfortunately, federal statutes provide little clarity concerning 
how to classify any individual worker, as Congress chose to define 
the term “employee” in entirely circular terms and it did so 
inconsistently from statute to statute. For example, the National 
Labor Relations Act defines an “employee” as “any employee” that 
does not fall within a small number of enumerated exceptions,68 
while the Fair Labor Standards Act tautologically declares that “the 
term ‘employee’ means any individual employed by an employer,”69 
which itself is defined as “any person acting directly or indirectly in 
the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.”70 State 
legislatures have hardly fared any better in defining these 
                                                
 65 See Micah Prieb Stolzfus Jost, Independent Contractors, Employees, and 
Entrepreneurialism Under the National Labor Relations Act, 68 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 311, 314 (2011). 
 66 See, e.g., Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, From Amazon to Uber: Defining 
Employment in the Modern Economy, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1673, 1684 (2016); 
Holloway, supra note 63, at 307. 
 67 Redfearn, supra note 64, at 1031. 
 68 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2014) (“The term ‘employee’ shall include any employee 
. . . but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in 
the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual 
employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of an 
independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any 
individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act, as 
amended from time to time, or by any other person who is not an employed as 
herein defined.”). 
 69 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2014). 
 70 Id. § 203(d). 
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amorphous concepts.71 As a result of this ambiguity, different 
agencies, courts, and states have come up with a wide variety of 
partially overlapping tests for determining whether a given worker 
is an employee or an independent contractor.72 
The Supreme Court long ago observed that these varying tests 
must be applied to “[m]yriad forms of service relationship[s], with 
infinite and subtle variations in the terms of employment,” the 
inevitable result of which is that while some workers can be easily 
categorized, many others nevertheless fall in between the two 
classifications as “the incidents of [their] employment partake in 
part of the one group, in part of the other, in varying proportions of 
weight.”73 As a consequence, both companies and courts must 
decide how to classify workers “against a background of barely 
                                                
 71 See, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW § 2(5) (2011) (“‘Employee’ means a mechanic, 
workingman or laborer working for another for hire.”). 
 72 Compare, e.g., FedEx Home Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 55, at *3 (Sept. 30, 
2014) (“In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an 
independent contractor, the following matters of fact, among others, are 
considered: (a) The extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may 
exercise over the details of the work. (b) Whether or not the one employed is 
engaged in a distinct occupation or business. (c) The kind of occupation, with 
reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction 
of the employer or by a specialist without supervision. (d) The skill required in 
the particular occupation. (e) Whether the employer or the workman supplies the 
instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work. (f) 
The length of time for which the person is employed. (g) The method of payment, 
whether by the time or by the job. (h) Whether or not the work is part of the regular 
business of the employer. (i) Whether or not the parties believe they are creating 
the relation of master and servant. (j) Whether the principal is or is not in the 
business.”), with Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296 at *4–7 (1987) (“twenty 
factors or elements have been identified as indicating whether sufficient control 
is present to establish an employer-employee relationship,” with the factors 
enumerated as: (1) instructions, (2) training, (3) integration, (4) services rendered 
personally, (5) hiring, supervising and paying assistants, (6) continuing 
relationship, (7) set hours of work, (8) full time required, (9) doing work on 
employer’s premises, (10) order or sequence set, (11) oral or written reports, (12) 
payment by hour, week, month, (13) payment of business and/or travelling 
expenses, (14) furnishing of tools and materials, (15) significant investment, (16) 
realization of profit or loss, (17) working for more than one firm at a time, (18) 
making service available to general public, (19) right to discharge, and (20) right 
to terminate). 
 73 Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 126 (1944). 
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reconcilable precedents.”74 This uncertainty is perhaps best 
demonstrated by a series of cases brought against FedEx in courts 
across the country, resulting in a number of inconsistent decisions 
regarding whether drivers performing the same tasks under the same 
terms and conditions for the same company should be classified as 
employees or independent contractors.75 Due in part to the 
significant sums of money at stake and the risks that such 
inconsistent and unpredictable litigation outcomes pose to 
businesses, the number of worker-misclassification cases filed in 
federal courts has grown by more than 500% over the past two 
decades.76 
The Gig Economy was born amidst this rising tide of 
employment litigation. Although some prominent government 
officials have called for a “regulatory timeout” to provide Gig 
Economy companies with an opportunity to determine whether their 
workers are properly classified as employees or independent 
contractors—or whether they should be subject to some new legal 
regime entirely, as discussed further below—these nascent 
companies have nevertheless been forced to choose sides under 
existing law.77 While the very existence of that wave of worker-
                                                
 74 Local 814 Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, & Warehousemen v. Nat’l 
Labor Relations Bd., 512 F.2d 564, 572 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Bazelon, C.J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 75 See Robert Sprague, Worker (Mis)Classification in the Sharing Economy: 
Square Pegs Trying to Fit in Round Holes, 31 A.B.A. J. OF LAB. & EMP. L. 53 
(2015) (collecting and discussing several FedEx cases); cf. Blake Stafford, Riding 
the Line Between “Employee” and “Independent Contractor” in the Modern 
Sharing Economy, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1223, 1232–33 (2016) (noting that 
national companies may have to classify workers differently depending on their 
location; that different federal statutes have different tests; and that different 
federal courts apply different tests for classification under federal statutes). 
 76 ANDREW SHERRILL, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR NEEDS A MORE SYSTEMATIC 
APPROACH TO DEVELOPING ITS GUIDANCE 3 (2014); see also Aaron Vehling, 
FLSA Class Actions to Hit Record High in 2016, LAW360 (Jan. 12, 2016, 10:53 
PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/745603/flsa-class-actions-to-hit-record-
high-in-2016. 
 77 Sara Ashley O’Brien, Senator Warner: On-Demand Firms Need Regulatory 
Timeout, CNN MONEY (Oct. 2, 2015 8:50 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/10
/01/technology/mark-warner-tapcon-on-demand/index.html; see also, e.g., Tess 
Townsend, Inside Hillary Clinton’s Secret Meeting with Silicon Valley Tech 
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misclassification litigation demonstrates that the issues addressed 
herein are not unique to the Gig Economy, Part IV of this Article 
will discuss specific litigation that demonstrates how the business 
model of leading Gig Economy companies highlights the 
ambiguities and imprecision in modern employment law. 
Many (though not all)78 Gig Economy companies classify their 
service-providers as independent contractors, but several downsides 
of this blanket approach are apparent. Setting aside the question of 
whether that classification is correct as a matter of law, utilizing 
independent contractors entails real costs for both the workers and 
the companies involved. For example, several Gig Economy 
companies have expressed a desire to provide various benefits and 
training to workers they have classified as independent contractors 
but fear that doing so might provide further ammunition for 
plaintiffs bringing misclassification suits.79 As explained by the 
leader of Peers, a membership organization comprised of Gig 
Economy workers, many companies in this sector “would probably 
love to give more training, if they could,” and “would probably like 
to give workers’ compensation,” but “if they do that, that’s a benefit. 
                                                
Execs, INC. (Aug. 7, 2015), https://www.inc.com/tess-townsend/silicon-valley-
executives-want-clinton-as-sharing-economy-chamption.html (reporting on 
discussions with Secretary Clinton concerning “coming up with a third 
classification for a sharing economy worker”); Letter from Senators Al Franken 
& Robert Casey to Secretary of Labor Thomas Perez (July 14, 2015), 
http://www.franken.senate.gov/files/documents/150714OnDemandEconomyLett
er.pdf (“We therefore ask that the Department of Labor provide clarification to 
current classification guidelines in order to help employers determine the 
appropriate designation of its workers within the on-demand economy.”). 
 78 See, e.g., Antonio Aloisi, Commoditized Workers: Case Study Research on 
Labor Law Issues Arising from a Set of “On-Demand/Gig Economy” Platforms, 
37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 653, 684–85 (2016) (discussing Gig Economy 
companies that classify workers as employees); Kessler, supra note 3 (discussing 
Gig Economy companies using both models). 
 79 See generally Carolyn Said, Employee vs. Freelancer? Choice Is Based on 
Outdated Laws, S.F. CHRON. (Aug. 7, 2015), http://www.sfchronicle.com
/business/article/Employee-vs-freelancer-Choice-is-based-on-6431933.php; 
Tracey Lien, As They Grow, On-Demand Firms Adapt, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 31, 2015. 
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Their workers start to look like an employee.”80 Indeed, some of the 
companies in question have remarked that providing such benefits 
“is something [they] think is important but [they] can’t do it.”81 The 
perverse result is that laws and regulations intended to help workers 
are instead actively harming them by preventing companies from 
extending benefits to independent contractors that both the 
contractor and company would prefer they be given. 
IV. GIG ECONOMY LITIGATION 
Among the harms posed by this legal ambiguity is the spate of 
lawsuits that have been brought against Gig Economy companies, 
in which billions of dollars in damages are on the line and the 
legality of the companies’ very business models have been called 
into question.82 Of those, lawsuits brought in the Northern District 
of California against Uber, Lyft, and Grubhub have proceeded 
furthest and received the lion’s share of press coverage. 
Accordingly, this Article will focus on these cases as representative 
of the issues likely to arise as judges and juries confront the 
questions presented by Gig Economy employment litigation. 
In discussing these cases, this Article endeavors not to endorse 
or critique the decisions reached to date. For present purposes, it is 
sufficient to summarize them because, regardless of whether or not 
they were correctly decided, they aptly demonstrate why many 
government officials have come to recognize the failings of current 
classifications and policies that “are still based on 20th century 
                                                
 80 Ellen Huet, Contractor or Employee? Silicon Valley’s Branding Dilemma, 
FORBES (Nov. 18, 2014, 11:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet
/2014/11/18/contractor-or-employee-silicon-valleys-branding-dilemma. 
 81 Id. 
 82 See, e.g., Singer v. Postmates, Inc., No. 15 Civ. 1284 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 
2017); Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., No. 13 Civ. 4065 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2016); O’Connor 
v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13 Civ. 3826 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2015); Levin v. Caviar, 
Inc., No. 15 Civ. 1285 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2015); Cobarruviaz v. Maplebear Inc., 
No. 15 Civ. 697 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2015); Iglesias v. Homejoy, No. 15 Civ. 1286 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2015); Otey v. Crowdflower, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 5524 (N.D. 
Cal. July 2, 2015); Taranto v. Washio, Inc., No. CGC-15-546584 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
June 29, 2015); Yucesoy v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 15 Civ. 262 (N.D. Cal. June 
12, 2015). 
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perceptions about work and income,”83 even as “the workplace and 
definitions of workers evolve away from traditional employment 
models.”84 Moreover, they illustrate the utter uncertainty and 
inefficiency that results from relying on costly and protracted 
litigation to determine whether workers are employees or 
independent contractors. The decisions issued in these cases are 
significant precisely because they each offer little guidance as to 
how the merits of such cases might be resolved. 
A. The Allegations and Procedural Background 
Lyft and Uber operate similar electronic platforms that allow 
potential passengers to use their smartphones to hail available 
drivers, who may then accept, decline, or ignore the passenger’s 
request for a ride.85 During the relevant time period, the companies’ 
business models were distinguishable based upon their payment 
mechanism: Lyft’s platform would recommend an amount for 
passengers to donate upon arrival at their destination, with 20% of 
the donation to be retained by Lyft as an administrative fee, but the 
passenger was ultimately free to pay any amount that they chose to 
the driver, or even nothing at all.86 In contrast, Uber would charge 
the rider’s credit card a specific fee that it determined to be 
appropriate, similarly keeping a portion of that fare for itself while 
passing on the majority of the payment to the driver.87 
Grubhub, meanwhile, provides a different type of platform 
through which customers can place a food order for pick up or 
delivery. Drivers may sign up to deliver food using Grubhub’s 
platform by reserving particular assignment “blocks” that 
correspond to specific time periods and geographic areas, which 
Grubhub designates in advance. Only one driver can sign up for a 
                                                
 83 Letter from Senator Mark Warner to Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker 
& Census Bureau Director John Thompson (Sept. 1, 2015). 
 84 Letter from Franken & Casey to Perez, supra note 77. 
 85 Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2015) [hereinafter 
Lyft II]; O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 
2015) [hereinafter Uber II]. 
 86 Lyft II, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1070–71. Lyft subsequently changed this policy, 
now mandating that passengers pay a minimum fare for every ride. Id. 
 87 Uber II, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1135. 
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particular block, but drivers may also receive delivery orders by 
turning on Grubhub’s app and making themselves available outside 
of their prearranged blocks. Drivers are expected to be available to 
accept delivery requests during their blocks and they are paid based 
on a formula taking into account the number of orders delivered and 
distance driven, with a guaranteed minimum average hourly wage if 
they meet certain thresholds during their blocks.88 
In the span of approximately two years, similar lawsuits were 
brought against Uber, Lyft, and Grubhub. First, on August 16, 2013, 
Douglas O’Connor and Thomas Colopy sued Uber in a putative 
class action alleging that Uber drivers had been misclassified as 
independent contractors rather than employees. O’Connor and 
Colopy alleged that Uber violated California law in several respects 
by doing so, including depriving drivers of expense reimbursements 
and improperly failing to remit to drivers all gratuities paid by 
riders.89 Two weeks later, on September 3, 2013, Patrick Cotter 
brought a similar class action suit against Lyft, alleging that by 
misclassifying its drivers, Lyft violated several California statutes 
that provide for minimum wages, reimbursement for work-related 
expenses, and other protections that California grants to employees 
but not to independent contractors.90 Lastly, a lawsuit was filed 
against Grubhub on September 23, 2015, which, after three 
complaints and two motions to dismiss, culminated in Grubhub 
facing allegations that, as a result of misclassifying its drivers as 
                                                
 88 Lawson v. Grubhub, Inc., No. 15 Civ. 5128, 2017 WL 2951608, at *1–3 
(N.D. Cal. July 10, 2017). 
 89 See Class Action Complaint & Jury Demand, O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 
(No. 13 Civ. 3826) (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2013); see also O’Connor v. Uber Techs., 
Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1113–14 (N.D. Cal. 2016) [hereinafter Uber IV] 
(explaining that such claims “are predicated on drivers being employees rather 
than independent contractors” under Cal. Lab. Code §§ 351 and 2802). The Uber 
complaint was subsequently amended twice. See First Amended Class Action 
Complaint & Jury Demand, O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13 Civ. 3826, 
(N.D. Cal. May 30, 2014), Dkt. No. 107; Second Amended Class Action 
Complaint & Jury Demand, O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13 Civ. 3826 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2014), Dkt. No. 199. 
 90 See Complaint, Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., No. 13 Civ. 4065 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 
2013), Dkt. No. 1; see also Lyft II, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1074–75 (discussing the 
“many benefits and protections” that California affords to employees but not 
independent contractors). 
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independent contractors, it had violated several provisions of the 
California Labor Code by failing to reimburse drivers’ business 
expenses, failing to pay minimum and overtime wages, and 
engaging in unlawful or unfair business practices.91 
The plaintiffs in all three lawsuits were represented by Shannon 
Liss-Riordan, who appears to have brought the suits in California 
based on her belief that its state laws are particularly worker-
friendly.92 Notably, the plaintiffs in both the Uber and Lyft litigation 
sought to have California law apply to all drivers who had used the 
companies’ platforms nationwide. The attempt to do so against Lyft 
was denied on August 7, 2014, with the nationwide class claims 
stricken but permission granted by the court to plead a putative class 
action representing California-based drivers.93 The Uber court 
initially reached the opposite result on December 5, 2013, holding 
that California employment law could apply to all drivers using 
Uber’s platform in light of the wording of their contract, in which 
“the parties agreed that the conduct giving rise to [their] claims is to 
                                                
 91 See generally Tan v. Grubhub, Inc., No. 15 Civ. 5128 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 
2016), 2016 WL 3743365 (denying motion to dismiss second amended 
complaint); Second Amended Class Action and PAGA Complaint, Tan v. 
Grubhub Holdings Inc., No. 15 Civ. 5128 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2016), Dkt. No. 41; 
Tan v. Grubhub, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 3d 998 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (partially granting 
and partially denying motion to dismiss first amended complaint); First Amended 
Class Action and PAGA Complaint, Tan v. Grubhub Holdings Inc., No. 15 Civ. 
5128 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2015), Dkt. No. 15; Notice of Removal of Class Action 
by Defendant Grubhub, Inc., Tan v. Grubhub, Inc., No. 15 Civ. 5128 (N.D. Cal. 
Nov. 9, 2015), Dkt. No. 1. The case against GrubHub was initially brought by 
Andrew Tan, with Raef Lawson being added as a named plaintiff upon 
amendment of the complaint. Tan voluntarily withdrew from the litigation after 
class certification was denied. Stipulation of Dismissal of Plaintiff Andrew Tan, 
Tan v. GrubHub Holdings Inc., No. 15 Civ. 5128 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2016), Dkt. 
No. 78. 
 92 See Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 2014) 
[hereinafter Lyft I] (“[T]he plaintiffs contend that . . . California’s laws are more 
worker-protective than those of other states.”). Indeed, Liss-Riordan brought so 
many misclassification cases in California, despite being admitted to the bar in 
Massachusetts, that she was eventually forced to seek admission to the California 
bar. Kia Kokalitcheva, Judge to Lawyer Suing Uber: Stop Filing in California, 
FORTUNE (Oct. 15, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/10/14/labor-lawyer-california-
license. 
 93 Lyft I, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1066. 
468 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 19: 443 
be governed by California law.”94 The class that was later certified 
in the Uber litigation nevertheless included only drivers who had 
used the platform in California.95 Grubhub, on the other hand, 
successfully moved for an order denying class certification on the 
grounds that nearly all of its drivers were subject to an arbitration 
agreement. Although the named plaintiff, Raef Lawson, had opted 
out of the arbitration agreement, the case could not proceed as a class 
action because he was one of only two California drivers to have 
done so.96 Accordingly, Lawson would continue to press his claims 
against Grubhub on an individual basis under California law.97 
B. The Merits of the Misclassification Claims 
At least one party in each of the three cases moved to have the 
courts determine as a matter of law whether the drivers had been 
misclassified as independent contractors, rather than employees. 
And, in each case, the judges found that they could not do so. Rather, 
their decisions made clear that California’s employment 
classification test was a poor fit for these Gig Economy companies 
because both the plaintiffs and defendants in each of the cases could 
cite myriad factors supporting either classification. 
Before they turned to the merits of the drivers’ classification, 
both Uber and Lyft first argued that the drivers did not work for 
them at all. That argument was flatly rejected in a pair of decisions 
issued on March 11, 2015.98 According to the Lyft court, “the 
                                                
 94 O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13 Civ. 3823 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2013) 
2013 WL 6354534, at *6 [hereinafter Uber I]. 
 95 O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13 Civ. 3826 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2015) 
2015 WL 5138097 [hereinafter Uber III]; see also O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 
311 F.R.D. 547 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (granting in part plaintiff’s supplemental motion 
for class certification on grounds not relevant to this Article). 
 96 Tan v. Grubhub, Inc., No. 15 Civ. 5128 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 2016) 2016 WL 
4721439. 
 97 See id. 
 98 It bears noting that judges have long been skeptical of such arguments—
Judge Learned Hand rejected a similar theory over one hundred years ago, 
explaining that it was “absurd” to classify a coal company’s miners as 
independent contractors “given that miners alone ‘carr[y] on the company’s only 
business.’” Jennifer Pinsof, A New Take on an Old Problem: Employee 
Misclassification in the Modern Gig Economy, 22 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. 
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argument that Lyft is merely a platform, and that drivers perform no 
service for Lyft, is not a serious one” given that Lyft “markets itself 
to customers as an on-demand ride service,” “it gives drivers 
detailed instructions about how to conduct themselves,” and “Lyft’s 
own drivers’ guide and FAQs state that drivers are ‘driving for 
Lyft.’”99 On the very same day, the Uber court similarly determined 
that the company’s assertion that it is “merely a technological 
intermediary between potential riders and potential drivers . . . is 
fatally flawed in numerous respects.”100 The court explained that 
“Uber is most certainly a transportation company, albeit a 
technologically sophisticated one,” because it “does not simply sell 
software; it sells rides.”101 As in the Lyft litigation, the Uber decision 
also relied on the company’s marketing materials, which refer to 
Uber as “Everyone’s Private Driver” and describe the company as a 
“transportation system” and the “best transportation service in San 
Francisco.”102 But, “more fundamentally,” the court noted that “Uber 
simply would not be a viable business entity without its drivers” 
because “Uber only makes money if its drivers actually transport 
passengers,” as “Uber’s revenues do not depend on the distribution 
of its software, but on the generation of rides by its drivers.”103 
Across the Grubhub, Lyft, and Uber litigation, the courts found 
that several of the same factors could point towards an employment 
relationship. For example, each of the Gig Economy defendants 
retained the right to terminate their relationship with the drivers at 
                                                
REV. 341, 342-43 (2016) (quoting Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F. 
547, 552 (2d Cir. 1914)). Contra Tomassetti, supra note 6, at 68 (describing such 
arguments in the Gig Economy context as “exceptional” and “noteworthy for 
shifting the discursive frontier” of employment litigation); but see Vasto v. 
Credico (USA) LLC, No. 15 Civ. 9298 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2017) 2017 WL 
4877424, at *16 (granting summary judgment in favor of defendant because it 
was not considered plaintiffs’ “employer” as it “neither formally nor functionally 
controlled” plaintiffs). 
 99 Lyft II, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1078. 
 100 Uber II, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1141. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. at 1141–42. 
 103 Id. at 1142 (emphasis in original). 
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will;104 they provided detailed suggestions (or, according to the 
plaintiffs, requirements) regarding how to carry out the drivers’ 
duties and used feedback systems to monitor the quality of the 
drivers’ performance;105 they set the terms of the drivers’ 
compensation;106 and the drivers were “wholly integrated,”107 
“central,”108 and “indispensable”109 to the services they offered. 
Nevertheless, several similar factors in each case could equally 
support a determination that the plaintiffs were properly classified 
as independent contractors. Among the factors supporting the Gig 
Economy defendants’ position were that the drivers retained control 
over where, when, and (arguably) how they performed their tasks;110 
they were not supplied with vehicles, uniforms, or standards of 
appearance by their alleged employers;111 they retained the ability to 
simultaneously work for other companies and clients;112 and they 
agreed to be independent contractors and recognized their status as 
such.113 In addition, in the Lyft and Uber cases (but not the Grubhub 
case), the drivers were compensated based on the particular tasks 
they completed, rather than on a salaried basis.114 
                                                
 104 Lyft II, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1079; Uber II, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1149; Lawson v. 
Grubhub, 2017 WL 2951608 at *4 (N.D. Cal. 2017); Uber III, 2015 WL 5138097, 
at *19–22. 
 105 Lyft II, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1078-79; Uber II, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1149-52; 
Grubhub, 2017 WL 2951608, at *4, *5; Uber III, 2015 WL 5138097, at *19. 
 106 Lyft II, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1080; Grubhub, 2017 WL 2951608, at *6; Uber 
III, 2015 WL 5138097, at *17–18. 
 107 Lyft II, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1079. 
 108 Grubhub, 2017 WL 2951608, at *6. 
 109 Uber III, 2015 WL 5138097, at *30. 
 110 Lyft II, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1078–79, 1081; Uber II, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1149–
52; Grubhub, 2017 WL 2951608, at *2, *5, *6; Uber III, 2015 WL 5138097, at 
*17, *19. 
 111 Lyft II, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1080, 1081; Uber II, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1153; 
Grubhub, 2017 WL 2951608, at *6; Uber III, 2015 WL 5138097, at *25, *29. 
 112 Lyft II, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1081; Grubhub, 2017 WL 2951608, at *6; Uber 
III, 2015 WL 5138097, at *18. 
 113 Lyft II, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1079; Uber II, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1153; Grubhub, 
2017 WL 2951608, at *6; Uber III, 2015 WL 5138097, at *27–28. 
 114 Compare Lyft II, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1080, and Uber III, 2015 WL 5138097, 
at *27, with Grubhub, 2017 WL 2951608, at *6. 
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As a result of the various factors working at cross-purposes, 
summary judgment was denied in all three cases.115 While the 
Grubhub court did not comment on the merits of California 
employment law, the judges overseeing the Uber and Lyft litigation 
both discussed how poorly the outmoded employee-contractor 
dichotomy fit the Gig Economy. The Uber court resigned itself to 
applying California’s multifactor test while nonetheless suggesting 
that it might be preferable for “the legislature or appellate courts [to] 
eventually refine or revise that test in the context of the new 
economy” because “[t]he application of the traditional test of 
employment—a test which evolved under an economic model very 
different from the new ‘sharing economy’—to Uber’s business 
model creates significant challenges” as “many of the factors . . . 
appear outmoded in this context.”116 Similarly, the Lyft court called 
for “legislative intervention” because “[t]he test the California 
courts have developed over the 20th Century for classifying workers 
isn’t very helpful in addressing this 21st Century problem,” noting 
the possibility that “perhaps Lyft drivers should be considered a new 
category of worker altogether, requiring a different set of 
protections” than either employees or independent contractors.117 
Making its frustration evident, the Lyft court further concluded that 
a jury would “be handed a square peg and asked to choose between 
two round holes,” as “California’s outmoded test for classifying 
workers . . . provides nothing remotely close to a clear answer” for 
how to treat Gig Economy workers.118 
C. Resolving the Litigation 
Following the denials of summary judgment, the parties soon 
sought to settle the Uber and Lyft litigation rather than risk trial. In 
both cases, the companies offered class members financial and non-
monetary concessions but the courts rejected the proposed 
settlements, finding the pecuniary compensation insufficient and the 
                                                
 115 Lyft II, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1069–70; Uber II, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1134; Grubhub, 
2017 WL 2951608, at *6. 
 116 Uber II, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1153. 
 117 Lyft II, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1081–82. 
 118 Id. 
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non-financial terms to be of questionable value, at best.119 Although 
the terms of the settlements varied,120 neither would have decisively 
resolved the question as to how the drivers should have been 
classified.121 Rather, the settlements would have barred class 
members from further litigation concerning their employment status 
without addressing the proper categorization of drivers who were 
not part of the settling class.122 A settlement was subsequently 
approved in the Lyft litigation after Lyft significantly increased the 
monetary relief and granted additional non-monetary concessions.123 
At the time of this Article’s submission, the Uber case was stayed 
pending the resolution of several appeals that were expected to 
significantly impact how the case would move forward.124 Lastly, 
there was not yet a decision following the Grubhub bench trial, 
which concluded in October 2017.125 
Many in the media have suggested that Grubhub, as the first 
such case to go to trial, could foreshadow the resolution of similar 
                                                
 119 Uber IV, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 1135 (describing compensation as “relatively 
modest when compared to the [potential] verdict value” and “the non-monetary 
relief [as] of little benefit to the class”); Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 3d 930, 
932, 938 (N.D. Cal. 2016) [hereinafter Lyft III] (finding proposed settlement 
“shortchanged” the drivers financially, “[t]he modest nonmonetary relief . . . does 
not come close to making up for the[] serious defects in the monetary aspect[s] of 
the settlement,” and that “[i]t is difficult to tell . . . just how significant” the non-
monetary concessions would be). 
 120 Compare Uber IV, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 1117–20, with Lyft III, 176 F. Supp. 
3d at 933–34. 
 121 Uber IV, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 1135 (“[T]he settlement does nothing to clarify 
the status of drivers as employees versus independent contractors. . . .”); Lyft III, 
176 F. Supp. 3d at 936–37 (rejecting objection that “any settlement that doesn’t 
confer employee status on Lyft drivers going forward” should be denied). 
 122 Uber IV, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 1119–20; Lyft III, 176 F. Supp. 3d at 934. 
 123 Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 3d 1030, 1037 & n. #2 (N.D. Cal. 2016) 
(granting preliminary approval of settlement); see also Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., No. 13 
Civ. 4065, 2017 WL 1033527 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2017) (granting final approval 
of settlement). 
 124 See Transcript of Hearing at 38–40, O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13 
Civ. 3826 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2016). 
 125 See, e.g., Joe Mullin, GrubHub ‘Gig Economy’ Trial Ends with Judge 
Calling Out Plaintiff’s Lies, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 30, 2017, 8:50 PM), 
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/10/grubhub-gig-economy-trial-ends-
with-judge-calling-out-plaintiffs-lies/. 
MAR. 2018] Independent Employees 473 
worker-misclassification cases involving the Gig Economy.126 It 
seems likely, however, that this theory reflects public relations 
efforts by Shannon Liss-Riordan, the attorney who represents the 
plaintiffs in the Grubhub, Lyft, and Uber litigation, as well as other 
Gig Economy cases.127 In light of the minuscule financial stakes in 
the Grubhub litigation resulting from the denial of class 
certification, the incentive to proceed to trial rather than settle may 
have come from Ms. Liss-Riordan’s hope that she could use 
Grubhub as proof of concept to leverage larger settlements in her 
other cases.128 There is no reason to expect that the Grubhub case is 
                                                
 126 See Dara Kerr, What Does the Grubhub Trial Mean for the Gig Economy?, 
CNET (Sept. 8, 2017, 12:38 PM PDT), https://www.cnet.com/news/what-does-
the-grubhub-trial-mean-for-the-gig-economy-uber-lyft-postmates-taskrabbit/; 
see also Megan Dickey, GrubHub Trial Could Have Major Implications for the 
Gig Economy, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 2, 2017), https://techcrunch.com
/2017/09/02/grubhub-trial-could-have-major-implications-for-the-gig-economy; 
David Morris, Labor Lawsuit Against Grubhub May Be a Stumbling Block for the 
Gig Economy, FORTUNE (Aug. 25, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/08/25
/grubhub-case-employee-contractor; Cyrus Farivar, Grubhub Trial May Finally 
Answer Contractor vs. Employee Quandary, ARS TECHNICA (June 30, 2017, 4:00 
AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/06/grubhub-trial-may-finally-
answer-contractor-vs-employee-quandary. 
 127 See Megan Dickey, Ex-GrubHub Driver Testifies on ‘Ghost Orders’ and the 
Acceptance Rate Hustle, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 6, 2017), https://techcrunch.com
/2017/09/06/grubhub-ex-driver-lawson-testify/ (“[A]s Liss-Riordan explained 
yesterday, she hopes a win could be a step in the right direction for ultimately 
forcing on-demand companies to classify [their] delivery workers as W-2 
employees.”). A small sample of the copious media attention that Ms. Liss-
Riordan has courted includes the following articles: Tracey Lien, Meet the 
Attorney Suing Uber, Lyft, GrubHub and a Dozen California Tech Firms, L.A. 
TIMES (Jan. 24, 2016, 10:19 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology
/la-fi-class-action-lawyer-20160124-story.html; Lauren Weber & Rachel 
Silverman, Meet the Boston Lawyer Who’s Putting Uber on Trial, WALL ST. J. 
(Nov. 4, 2015, 11:47 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/meet-the-boston-
lawyer-whos-putting-uber-on-trial-1446596980; Annie Lowrey, How One 
Woman Could Destroy Uber’s Business Model—and Take the Entire ‘On 
Demand’ Economy Down with It, N.Y. MAG. (Apr. 30, 2015, 7:30 AM), 
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/04/meet-the-lawyer-fighting-ubers-
business-model.html. 
 128 See Plaintiff’s Pre-Trial Brief & Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions 
of Law at 26-29, Lawson v. Grubhub Inc., No. 15 Civ. 5128 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 
2017), Dkt. No. 180 (calculating Lawson’s damages as “at least $286.10 in 
unreimbursed mileage expenses” and “approximately $273.62 of minimum wage 
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capable of answering the broader question of whether other Gig 
Economy workers are properly classified as independent contractors 
or employees. That is because the decision in a single case involving 
one Grubhub driver will not bind and may not predict how other 
judges, juries, regulators or arbitrators might resolve the question of 
how other Grubhub drivers should be classified in light of the factors 
pointing in each direction, particularly if such disputes are not 
decided under California law.129 Moreover, the forthcoming decision 
regarding Grubhub will shine minimal light on other companies’ 
distinguishable employment practices in light of Grubhub’s 
distinctive assignment blocking system. To avoid the uncertainties 
and expense of litigation going forward, a new system is needed. 
V. A NEW CLASSIFICATION FOR WORKERS 
A. The Need for an Intermediate Category 
Courts and commentators alike have struggled to determine the 
optimal treatment for Gig Economy workers. Several potential 
approaches have been proposed, but each suffers from various 
maladies. First, some scholars have suggested that there is no 
problem to be solved because Gig Economy workers are properly 
classified as employees under the current legal regime.130 As 
                                                
damages”). Because the case was properly removed to federal court pursuant to 
the Class Action Fairness Act, Tan v. Grubhub, Inc. 171 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1003 
(2016), the “district court’s subsequent denial of Rule 23 class certification [did] 
not divest the court of jurisdiction,” United Steel v. Shell Oil Co., 602 F.3d 1087, 
1092 (9th Cir. 2010). But see Kevin Lampone, Class Certification as a 
Prerequisite for CAFA Jurisdiction, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1151, 1154 (2012) (arguing 
that “[w]hen federal courts deny certification to a putative class, [the Class Action 
Fairness Act] requires that cases initially filed in state court be remanded.”). 
 129 Cf. Res Judicata, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining res 
judicata as an “affirmative defense barring the same parties from litigating a 
second lawsuit on the same claim” (emphasis added)). 
 130 See, e.g., Pinsof, supra note 98, at 355 (“Unless and until legal reform 
occurs, courts should classify Uber drivers and similarly situated workers in the 
gig-economy as employees.”); Brishen Rogers, Employment Rights in the 
Platform Economy: Getting Back to Basics, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 479, 513 
(2016) (arguing that “Uber is not a hard case” such that “a court . . . could find 
Uber drivers to be employees as a matter of law” (emphasis in original)); Alyssa 
Stokes, Driving Courts Crazy: A Look at How Labor and Employment Laws Do 
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demonstrated by the Grubhub, Lyft, and Uber cases, however, the 
federal judiciary has made clear that the traditional tests for worker 
classification do not cleanly map onto the Gig Economy.131 
Second, certain commentators have argued that the employee-
contractor dichotomy should be maintained, but that the law should 
be changed in some manner such that all Gig Economy workers 
would be considered employees.132 Yet that approach risks 
cannibalizing the business model of many Gig Economy companies 
by drastically increasing their cost structure, likely leading to a 
decrease in consumer welfare as those costs are passed on to the 
platforms’ users.133 Far more importantly, it would likely be a 
pyrrhic victory for Gig Economy workers because it would also 
endanger the very flexibility that has drawn many of them to the Gig 
Economy in the first place, as their putative employers would have 
every incentive to exert the maximum level of control for which they 
would be paying. Put another way, if a company is “made to give its 
workers all the benefits, protections, and entitlements of 
employment, then that company will expect the worker to behave 
like an employee.”134 While this trade-off might seem attractive to 
some labor scholars,135 survey data strongly suggests that it is not 
                                                
Not Coincide with Ride Platforms in the Sharing Economy, 95 NEB. L. REV. 853, 
871 (2017) (“Drivers of ride platforms in the sharing economy are likely to be 
classified as employees under California law . . . . It is probable the same result 
follows under the FLSA . . . .”). 
 131 See supra Part IV (discussing Lawson v. Grubhub, Inc., No. 15 Civ. 5128 
(N.D. Cal.), Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., No. 13 Civ. 4065 (N.D. Cal.), and O’Connor v. 
Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13 Civ. 3826 (N.D. Cal.)). 
 132 See, e.g., Miriam Cherry & Antonio Aloisi, “Dependent Contractors” in the 
Gig Economy: A Comparative Approach, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 635, 683 (2017) 
(arguing for a presumption under which “the default classification would be an 
employment relationship”); Rogers, supra note 130, at 505 (“Uber should owe 
employment duties to its drivers”). 
 133 See, e.g., Stafford, supra note 75, at 1251 (“If the distinction is collapsed in 
favor of more protection for all workers, the associated costs of compliance would 
severely erode one of the core pillars of the sharing economy business model—
low transaction costs.”). 
 134 Holloway, supra note 63, at 317. 
 135 See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 130, at 509–10 (“If the problem is that drivers 
now engage in personal business while on work hours, Uber could prohibit them 
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what the vast majority of Gig Economy workers actually want: 74% 
reported that Uber made their lives better by allowing them to 
control their schedule, while 73% stated that they would prefer a job 
in which they choose their schedule and act as their own boss over 
“a steady 9-to-5 job with some benefits and a set salary.”136 Although 
there is surely some combination of benefits and salary that most 
Gig Economy workers would accept in exchange for a more 
traditional form of employment in which they exercised less 
autonomy, the polling data supports the proposition that it is 
precisely “those who value flexibility most” that “are the most likely 
to seek opportunities” in the Gig Economy.137 
Third, Senator John Thune recently introduced the New 
Economy Works to Guarantee Independence and Growth (“NEW 
GIG”) Act of 2017, which would take the opposite tact by 
“preserv[ing] the common law rules for worker classification” while 
creating a safe harbor under which service-providers would be 
treated as independent contractors and platforms would not be 
treated as their employer.138 Qualification for the legislation’s safe 
harbor would depend on what Senator Thune describes as “three 
areas that are intended to demonstrate the independence of the 
service provider . . . based on objective criteria,” but a cursory 
review of the three areas makes clear that enactment of the NEW 
GIG Act would not accomplish Senator Thune’s goal of moving 
away from “a subjective facts-and-circumstances analysis.”139 Each 
of the NEW GIG Act’s three factors has three sub-factors, creating 
a new nine-factor test that provides no clear basis for classification 
                                                
from doing so . . . . If the problem is that drivers use multiple platforms, Uber 
could require drivers to use its platform exclusively . . . .”). 
 136 See Hall & Krueger, supra note 32, at 11–12. 
 137 Id. at 11. 
 138 Press Release, Sen. John Thune, Thune Introduces Bill to Add Certainty to 
Worker Classification Rules (July 13, 2017), https://www.thune.senate.gov
/public/index.cfm/press-releases?id=c91d4e97-ccdc-4abf-bebd-ed72c02a8752. 
 139 Sen. John Thune, NEW GIG Act of 2017 Summary of Provisions (July 13, 
2017), https://www.thune.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/140b9d0a-eddd-44ad-
82e5-cc45e0218db9/235D993AF71C5ED8FA62BD8BFF3F3D7E.bill-
summary-final-7-13-17.pdf. 
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when the different factors fail to point in the same direction.140 
Accordingly, the NEW GIG Act would do little to clarify any given 
misclassification dispute or move away from the flaws of our current 
system. 
Fourth, some commentators have suggested doing away with the 
independent contractor-employee distinction entirely, instead 
proposing that “a basic set of benefits and labor standards must be 
universal across all employers and all forms of employment” that 
would “put all employees and employers alike on an equal 
footing.”141 Yet to the extent that this would allow employers to exert 
greater control over workers currently classified as independent 
contractors in exchange for the greater benefits to be provided and 
liabilities imposed, such an approach suffers from the same 
infirmities as previously discussed with regard to proposals to 
broaden the employee categorization.142 Moreover, such proposals 
elide the fundamental problem of how to define employment, rather 
than proposing ways to solve it. Even if workers are not divided 
between employees and independent contractors, some test would 
still be necessary to distinguish between workers and non-workers, 
and, with respect to workers, how to determine for whom one is 
working. It is too facile to declare that “if you work for someone 
                                                
 140 Id. (listing as factors “(1) the relationship between the parties (e.g., job-by-
job arrangement, the service provider incurs his or her own business expenses, the 
service provider is not tied to a single service recipient); (2) the location of the 
services or the means by which the services are provided (e.g., the service provider 
has his or her own place of business, does not work exclusively at the service 
recipient’s place of business, provides his or her own tools and supplies); and (3) 
a written contract with specific requirements (e.g., stating the independent-
contractor relationship, acknowledging that the service provider is responsible for 
his or her own taxes, providing the service recipient’s reporting and withholding 
obligations).”). 
 141 Nick Hanauer & David Rolf, Shared Security, Shared Growth, 37 
DEMOCRACY J. (Summer 2015), http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/37
/shared-security-shared-growth. 
 142 Notably, prominent proponents of this approach have focused primarily on 
what benefits would accrue to employees without reference to what added duties 
or burdens might be imposed on them. See generally id. 
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else, you’re an employee,”143 a test that provides no more objective 
guidance for making future decisions as to when one works for 
someone else, or determining for whom one works, than “I know it 
when I see it.”144 
Fifth, still others have argued that blanket classifications for Gig 
Economy workers are “inappropriate” and therefore workers 
“should be classified individually.”145 As an initial matter, it is not 
clear why workers for any given company would generally be so 
differently positioned from others working for the same company 
with respect to the factors determining employment status that 
individual classification would be a sensible approach. Indeed, that 
very argument was rejected in the Uber litigation.146 But even if 
there were sufficient differences across a given company’s 
workforce, such an approach would be both impractical and 
counterproductive. By definition, it would not operate at scale. To 
return to our familiar example, there is no feasible way for Uber to 
reach a considered individual determination as to the proper 
classification of each of its several hundred thousand drivers. 
Putting that Herculean (or possibly Sisyphean) task into perspective, 
Uber operates with a headcount comparable to the largest of the 
Fortune 500 companies.147 A veritable army of human resources 
                                                
 143 Nathan Heller, Is the Gig Economy Working?, NEW YORKER, May 15, 2017, 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/05/15/is-the-gig-economy-working 
(quoting political scientist Jacob Hacker). 
 144 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring); cf. 
Neil Irwin, To Understand Rising Inequality, Consider the Janitors at Two Top 
Companies, Then and Now, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/03/upshot/to-understand-rising-inequality-
consider-the-janitors-at-two-top-companies-then-and-now.html (noting that 
“major companies have . . . chosen to bifurcate their work force, contracting out 
much of the labor that goes into their products to other companies” whereas “a 
generation ago, big companies . . . more often directly employed people” and 
discussing the reduced benefits to workers who are hired indirectly). 
 145 Redfearn, supra note 64, at 1054; see also Means & Steiner, supra note 7, 
at 1539 (arguing for a test that would “avoid[] sweeping all workers in the on-
demand economy into one category or the other” because their circumstances 
“may vary greatly . . . even for workers who operate within a single company”). 
 146 See Uber III, 2015 WL 5138097 at *2. 
 147 Compare Biz Carson, Why There’s a Good Chance Your Uber Driver Is 
New, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 24, 2015, 11:34 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com
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managers would be required simply to administer the process of 
making individualized decisions for the tens of thousands of new 
Uber drivers enlisting every week,148 yet Uber would also have the 
additional burden of regularly updating all of its individual decisions 
regarding its preexisting drivers’ designations as their usage of 
Uber’s platform changes over time.149 Even more importantly, 
requiring individualized decisions would not provide any additional 
clarity as to how a given worker should be classified. Instead, it 
would exponentially increase the confusion and uncertainty faced 
by both workers and businesses. Encouraging individualized 
classification decisions would also risk introducing significant new 
opportunities for gamesmanship by companies seeking to induce 
particular behavior by individual workers in order to achieve a 
desired classification.150 
Lastly, many have noted the possibility of creating a third 
classification for workers, but generally they have been vague about 
what such a classification might look like.151 And though other 
                                                
/uber-doubles-its-drivers-in-2015-2015-10 (Uber had 327,000 active drivers in 
the United States as of September 2015), with Claire Zillman & Stacy Jones, 
Fortune 500 Companies with the Most Employees, FORTUNE (June 13, 2015), 
http://fortune.com/2015/06/13/fortune-500-most-employees/ (stating that UPS, 
the eighth largest employer among the Fortune 500, had 336,150 employees in 
2015). 
 148 See Carson, supra note 147 (“Each week, tens of thousands of drivers across 
the U.S. begin using the Uber app.”). 
 149 See Hall & Krueger, supra note 32, at 20 (“In any given week, well more 
than half (65 percent) of [Uber’s] driver-partners drive more than 25 percent, or 
less than 25 percent, than the amount they drove in the previous week. Only 17 
percent of driver-partners tend to drive within 10 percent of the amount of time 
that they drove in the previous week.”). 
 150 See Noam Scheiber, How Uber Uses Psychological Tricks to Push Its 
Drivers’ Buttons, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2017) (describing the use of “psychological 
inducements and other techniques unearthed by social science to influence when, 
where and how long drivers work”). 
 151 See, e.g., James Surowiecki, Gigs With Benefits, NEW YORKER (July 6, 
2015), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/07/06/gigs-with-benefits; 
Lauren Weber, What If There Were a New Type of Worker? Dependent 
Contractor, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 28, 2015, 10:28 AM ET), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-if-there-were-a-new-type-of-worker-
dependent-contractor-1422405831; see also Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Through the Lens 
of Innovation, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 951, 987–88 (2016) (using the Uber 
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countries have experimented with intermediate classifications, it is 
not clear how much the United States can learn from their 
experiences.152 This Article attempts to help fill that void by 
outlining one such possible classification that could be implemented 
through federal legislation to strike a balance between competing 
principles of freedom of contract, fairness, and the need to protect 
workers who lack sufficient bargaining power to protect 
themselves.153 
B. The Independent Employee 
1. Identifying Independent Employees 
While some have suggested the term “dependent contractor” for 
a hybrid classification between employees and independent 
                                                
litigation as an example of how, “instead of applying existing classifications from 
old laws that fail to account for challenges presented by the new sharing economy, 
the law can be better designed” by new legislation and regulations that “allow 
more flexibility”); Holloway, supra note 63, at 326 (“Instead of further 
manipulating these already overwrought tests for employment, it should be 
acknowledged that gig work is not just a new name for something old. A different 
kind of work has emerged, and new rules need to be developed.”); Stemler, supra 
note 6, at 61–62 (“Instead of classifying Uber drivers and other supply-side users 
in the sharing economy as either employees or independent contractors, regulators 
should create a new classification” that “would enable regulators to think 
differently about how to fill regulatory gaps.”); Stokes, supra note 130, at 882–
83 (“[O]ur labor laws should change—providing a new classification for 
employees in the sharing economy” that “would provide some of the protections 
these workers desire, without hindering innovation.”). 
 152 See generally Cherry & Aloisi, supra note 132 (discussing Canada’s 
intermediate category, which would exclude Gig Economy workers because it 
applies to workers who are economically dependent on a single company, and 
intermediate categories as introduced in Italy and Spain, both of which the authors 
find to have been problematic). 
 153 See SETH HARRIS & ALAN KRUEGER, A PROPOSAL FOR MODERNIZING 
LABOR LAWS FOR TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY WORK: THE ‘INDEPENDENT 
WORKER’ 15 (2015) (explaining that federal legislation must be used because 
neither state legislatures, courts, nor regulators are empowered to address the 
complete set of issues faced by independent employees); see also Rogers, supra 
note 130, at 496–500 (arguing that the notion of employment is inherently a 
“value-laden question” that necessarily rests upon policy considerations because 
“‘legal duties are not discoverable facts of nature’” (quoting Tarasoff v. Regents 
of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976))). 
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contractors,154 this name is inapt because there is good reason to 
believe that the majority of Gig Economy workers are not dependent 
on the platforms for which they work.155 Indeed, the vast majority of 
Uber drivers have other sources of income, with a plurality of Uber 
drivers describing their earnings from Uber as “a supplement to their 
income but not a significant source.”156 Moreover, suggesting that 
these workers are dependent fails to account for the most important 
and valued characteristics of Gig Economy work: the flexibility and 
autonomy that such work provides.157 Accordingly, workers in this 
hybrid category should instead be referred to as “independent 
employees.” 
In an oft-cited concurrence discussing the difficulty of 
distinguishing between employees and independent contractors, 
Judge Easterbrook noted the traditional tests’ failure to adhere to a 
bedrock legal principle: “People are entitled to know the legal rules 
before they act.”158 Because litigation “is costly and introduces risk 
into any endeavor,” legal rules should “struggle to eliminate the risk 
and help people save the costs” rather than rely on approaches 
“under which no one can know where he stands until litigation has 
been completed.”159 After all, there is no social benefit to keeping 
both companies and workers in the dark about the proper legal 
classification of their agreed-upon relationship with one another. 
Companies suffer because they face uncertain costs; workers cannot 
predict what benefits they qualify for and will ultimately receive; 
and both recognize that the only way to resolve these issues is 
through expensive, protracted, and entirely unpredictable litigation. 
Moreover, because each set of facts is unique, as is each fact-finder, 
prior decisions provide little guidance as to how any given case will 
                                                
 154 See St. Joseph News-Press & Teamsters Union Local 460, 345 N.L.R.B. 
474, 484 (2005) (Liebman, dissenting); Jost, supra note 65, at 337. 
 155 See Hall & Krueger, supra note 32, at 11. 
 156 Id. 
 157 See id.  
 158 Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1539 (7th Cir. 1987). Notably, 
Judge Easterbrook’s Lauritzen concurrence was referenced in both the Uber and 
Lyft cases. See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1147 (N.D. 
Cal. 2015) (Uber II); Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1077 (N.D. Cal. 
2015) (Lyft II).  
 159 Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1539. 
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be decided on the merits under the myriad multifactor tests that 
courts now apply.160 
It should therefore be taken as a first principle that one of the 
primary goals of the “independent employee” classification must be 
predictability: the parties to an agreement should have confidence 
concerning how disputes regarding their relationship are likely to be 
resolved. Specifically, there should be a rebuttable presumption that 
workers are properly classified as “independent employees” where 
companies and workers enter into an agreement expressly stating 
that such a classification applies. Although the parties’ subjective 
understanding of their relationship is among the factors that courts 
look to in evaluating employment claims, judges often view the 
parties’ meeting of the minds as being entitled little weight.161 To the 
contrary, it should be presumed that the parties’ agreement as to 
their relationship is correct. While this admits of some danger that 
the party with more bargaining power (which will typically be the 
employer) will choose the classification that best suits its own 
interests,162 there is no way to avoid unequal bargaining power in 
capitalist economies such that its presence cannot provide the basis 
for a bright-line test as to whether a contractual agreement will be 
honored.163 Moreover, it is clear that the current system, in which the 
parties’ agreement is accorded minimal deference, does not work 
well for anyone involved. Instead, it leads only to ambiguity that 
encourages conduct testing the limits of the current classification 
                                                
 160 See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 66, at 1704–05 (“because of the 
permeable nature of the courts’ non-exhaustive lists, [existing] multi-factored 
approaches to employment determinations have their own problems” such that 
“businesses and workers can do little more than guess at the legal significance of 
their relationships to one another.”). 
 161 See, e.g., O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13 Civ. 3826 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 
1, 2015) 2015 WL 5138097, at *6, *28 (Uber III) (holding that “the label placed 
by parties on their relationship is not dispositive” and “is typically not entitled to 
significant weight” (quoting Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 
F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2014))). 
 162 See Means & Steiner, supra note 7, at 1519–21 (arguing that “substantial 
inequality of economic power distorts the actual structure of labor markets” where 
“workers lack the leverage to demand better terms”). 
 163 See Rogers, supra note 130, at 495. 
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regime, harming both companies and workers.164 A result worse than 
the status quo is difficult to envision. 
In situations in which there is good reason to believe that 
workers have been misclassified, litigation would, of course, remain 
an option. In order to determine whether the presumption had been 
applied in error and should be found to have been rebutted, courts 
should eschew the complex and convoluted multi-factor tests 
developed to distinguish employees from independent contractors. 
As Professor Orly Lobel has derisively explained, these tests may 
make for “a good law school hypothetical” because they allow for 
“cluttered” arguments as to how each individual fact may point in a 
different direction, but their “notoriously messy” nature precludes 
confident prediction as to how any given case will or should be 
resolved.165 Put another way by Judge Easterbrook, a “legal 
approach calling upon judges to examine all of the facts, and balance 
them, avoids formulating a rule of decision.”166 After all, “unless we 
have a legal rule with which to sift the material from the 
immaterial,” courts cannot uniformly apply the law because there is 
no universal agreement as to “[w]hich facts matter, and why.”167 
Instead of the nineteen factors discussed in the Uber litigation,168 
for example, courts should go back to basics and require the party 
challenging the presumptive classification to prove the classification 
is wrong based solely upon the simple, traditional common-law test 
of agency, which asks whether a putative employer controls or has 
the right to control a putative employee’s performance of work, 
without requiring the application of multi-factor tests under which 
no factor is dispositive.169 Focusing on control would also reflect 
                                                
 164 See Stafford, supra note 75, at 1242–43; see also Lobel, supra note 39, at 68 
(arguing that the absence of an intermediate category harms workers by 
incentivizing companies to recategorize employees as contractors). 
 165 Lobel, supra note 39, at 59. 
 166 Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1539 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 167 Id. 
 168 O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13 Civ. 3826 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2015) 
2015 WL 5138097 *17–30. 
 169 Compare RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 2(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1933) 
(“An independent contractor is a person who contracts with another to do 
something for him but who is not controlled by the other nor subject to the other’s 
right to control with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of the 
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Coase’s insight that the “dominant characteristic” distinguishing 
between different types of workers is the extent to which they are 
subject to an employer empowered to dictate their terms of 
employment.170 The control test can be utilized in the employment 
law context to develop a body of case-law as to where a worker must 
fall on the control spectrum to qualify as an employee, independent 
employee, or independent contractor, without resorting to the rigid 
examination of every imaginable factor under the sun. And because 
the hallmarks of the Gig Economy include providing workers with 
significant (but not complete) control over if, when, and how to 
perform the services they provide, the amount of control exerted by 
the putative employer is an appropriate test for whether or not a Gig 
Economy worker is truly an independent employee rather than a 
traditional employee or independent contractor.171 This sliding scale 
would allow businesses to determine precisely what their brand 
should signify, granting them a choice between exercising 
significant control in order to supply consumers with a more 
uniform product or service provided by employees, relinquishing all 
control over how the product or service is delivered by independent 
contractors, or seeking a middle ground through the use of 
independent employees.172 
There are a multitude of variations as to precisely how such a 
system could be formalized. By way of example, one version might 
incorporate Coase’s description of the “right to control” an 
employee as the power to dictate “when to work . . . and when not 
                                                
undertaking.”), and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(3) (AM. LAW INST. 
1958) (same), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a) (AM. LAW 
INST. 2006) (“[A]n employee is an agent whose principal controls or has the right 
to control the manner and means of the agent’s performance of work.”). 
 170 Coase, supra note 48, at 404. 
 171 Cf. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 66, at 1717–23 (discussing how a 
control-based analysis applies to Gig Economy companies); Holloway, supra note 
63, at 309–11 (same). 
 172 See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 66, at 1726 (explaining that “firms 
that expect independent contractors . . . to produce particularized outcomes often 
provide detailed instructions about how contractors must produce those 
outcomes” but arguing that if “end-user firms truly wish to avoid the obligations 
that come with employer status, then they must fully relinquish their control over 
decisions that directly affect working conditions”). 
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to work, and . . . how to do it”173 by focusing on those powers while 
recognizing that control over the time and place of work can be 
considered more oppressive than control over how work is 
performed. To see how this could work in practice, consider once 
again Grubhub, Lyft, and Uber. Under such a system, Grubhub’s 
drivers could be classified as employees in light of the considerable 
control that the company’s assignment blocking system exercises 
over them, as it allows Grubhub to dictate when and where drivers 
are expected to be available for deliveries. Meanwhile, if Lyft were 
to institute rules regarding how drivers must behave while 
completing assignments obtained via its platform without placing 
any restrictions on when and where such assignments must be 
accepted, that lesser exercise of control could suffice to have Lyft 
drivers qualify as independent employees. Lastly, if Uber were to 
allow drivers discretion over where, when, and how to complete 
their assignments, as it claims to do now, the drivers’ unfettered 
authority over their own work would render them independent 
contractors. 
While arguing that the Gig Economy offers little beyond 
exploitation of new technologies to engage in regulatory arbitrage, 
Professor Julia Tomassetti poses the question of why “we more 
readily accept that Uber intermediates between buyers and sellers, 
but that a restaurant does not intermediate a market between buyers 
of hospitality services (diners) and sellers (waiters)?”174 That 
question is easily answered when viewed through the lens of a 
control-based test and provides an apt example of why such a test 
would work well. Restaurants employ a variety of staff in addition 
to waiters, such as hosts, chefs of various types, bartenders, busboys, 
dishwashers, and administrators to oversee their day-to-day 
operations. Indeed, the very purpose of hiring management at 
restaurants is to exercise control over the restaurant’s staff to ensure 
that they perform their respective tasks in a coordinated manner in 
order to provide a seamless experience to diners. A restaurant could 
hardly operate without exercising control over its employees—how 
else might it meet consumer demand by ensuring that it had the 
                                                
 173 Coase, supra note 48, at 404. 
 174 Tomassetti, supra note 6, at 77. 
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proper number of staff at each position at the proper time, all of 
whom must work together for the restaurant to run smoothly? No 
restaurant would stay in business long if it could not ensure that it 
had the requisite number of cooks in the kitchen or that it might not 
have enough clean plates and silverware because the dishwashing 
staff had not shown up to work when they were expected to do so. 
Even most seemingly simple businesses require coordination, which 
in turn requires either control over employees or the imposition of 
significant transaction costs involved in repeatedly hiring 
independent contractors on an ad hoc basis. 
Moreover, Gig Economy companies are not analogous to an 
individual restaurant because they are not limited to a single market. 
To the extent Professor Tomasetti’s analogy holds, the better 
comparison for a Gig Economy company would be a national or 
global chain of restaurants operating across numerous markets. Yet 
such chains require exponentially more coordination, and therefore 
control, to ensure that they provide a uniform product across their 
branches. Even a chain of coffee shops could not function if it did 
not know whether or when their baristas would show up to work, or 
at which location they would choose to do so on any given day. For 
this very reason, large companies have already begun to use “state-
of-the-art software that forecasts store traffic and helps managers set 
staff levels accordingly.”175 
Contrary to Professor Tomassetti’s implication, Uber is different 
than typical employers because it does not guarantee a driver for all 
passengers at all times and locations, nor does it promise a passenger 
for all drivers. Rather, it provides a lightly regulated platform 
through which available drivers and passengers can find one 
                                                
 175 Noam Scheiber, Starbucks Falls Short After Pledging Better Labor 
Practices, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/24
/business/starbucks-falls-short-after-pledging-better-labor-practices.html; see 
also, e.g., Jodi Kantor, Working Anything but 9 to 5: Scheduling Technology 
Leaves Low-Income Parents with Hours of Chaos, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/starbucks-workers-
scheduling-hours.html (“Along with virtually every major retail and restaurant 
chain, Starbucks relies on software that choreographs workers in precise, intricate 
ballets, using sales patterns and other data to determine which of its 130,000 
baristas are needed in its thousands of locations and exactly when.”). 
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another. Precisely because it does not need to coordinate different 
functions and does not endeavor to provide a uniform service each 
time a user logs on to the platform, it has no need to control workers 
in the same manner as traditional employers.  
As compared to Professor Tomasetti’s hypothetical restaurant, 
the Gig Economy embraces “a radically different mode of 
production” that does not employ a similar level of control.176 And 
those companies which assert the least control over users of their 
platform could most plausibly argue that their users are neither 
independent nor traditional employees but true third-party 
independent contractors. It nevertheless remains the case that for 
many companies, such as the restaurants discussed above, cutting 
costs by classifying workers as either independent employees or 
independent contractors likely would not be worth the trade-off 
involved in ceding control over whether, when, where, and how 
those workers do their jobs. 
2. Legal Protections Afforded to Independent Employees 
Having defined how to determine if a worker qualifies as an 
independent employee, this Article next turns to the benefits that 
would accrue to those falling within this category. First, the various 
civil rights protections provided to employees should be expanded 
to cover independent employees as well. For example, companies 
should not be allowed to discriminate against independent 
employees based on various personal traits, such as their sex, race, 
color, national origin, religion, age, or disabilities—just as they are 
prohibited from discriminating against employees based on such 
characteristics.177 These protections constitute the low-hanging fruit 
of independent employee protections. Simply stated, there is no 
social benefit promoted by allowing employer discrimination, 
regardless of whether it targets employees, independent contractors, 
or independent employees.178 Indeed, Congress has already begun 
                                                
 176 Michal S. Gal & Niva Elkin-Koren, Algorithmic Consumers, 30 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 309, 348 (2017). 
 177 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. (1967); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1964). 
 178 Cf. Danielle Tarantolo, From Unemployment to Contract: Section 1981 and 
Antidiscrimination Law for the Independent Contractor Workforce, 116 YALE L.J. 
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the process of extending certain protections to all workers where 
there is only limited benefit, if any, to withholding those protections 
from non-employees.179 
Second, the National Labor Relations Act and federal antitrust 
statutes should be amended to allow independent employees to 
unionize and collectively bargain.180 Although some have argued 
that Gig Economy companies should engage with organized groups 
of workers while stopping short of advocating for the use of 
unions181—a distinction drawn in the rejected Uber settlement, in 
which the parties agreed to allow drivers to organize but not 
unionize182—that suggestion fails to account for the risk that it would 
lead workers to run afoul of federal antitrust law. Although antitrust 
law provides for a labor exemption that protects union activities by 
employees,183 that exemption could be held inapplicable to 
independent employees under established case-law.184 Indeed, the 
                                                
170 (2006) (arguing for broader application of federal laws barring employment 
discrimination against independent contractors). 
 179 See Lobel, supra note 39, at 63 (discussing extension of certain speech rights 
under the Dodd-Frank and Sarbanes-Oxley Acts to all workers). 
 180 See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1935) (“Employees shall have the right to self-
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through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted 
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection 
. . . .”). 
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 182 See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1118–19 (N.D. 
Cal. 2016). 
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forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural 
organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help . . . or to forbid or restrain 
individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the 
legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, 
be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, 
under the antitrust laws.”). 
 184 Compare Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 503 (1940) (holding 
employees’ strike was not an antitrust violation because “restraints on the sale of 
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Chamber of Commerce has already attempted to use federal antitrust 
laws to enjoin a Seattle ordinance that would allow certain Gig 
Economy workers to collectively bargain.185 
Although this problem could also be avoided by amending the 
antitrust laws to create an independent employee exemption without 
providing independent employees the full protections of the 
National Labor Relations Act, the benefits of such a middle-ground 
approach are unclear.186 While American labor law is far from 
perfect, there is no shortage of ideas for how to improve it in ways 
preferable to throwing the baby out with the bathwater by starting 
anew with an entirely untested form of organizing labor.187 
Moreover, to the extent that workers for any given Gig Economy 
company might be inclined to try to organize outside the strictures 
of the National Labor Relations Act, they should be given the 
                                                
the employee’s services to the employer, however much they curtail the 
competition among employees, are not in themselves combinations or 
conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce under the Sherman Act”), with 
Columbia River Packers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143, 147 (1942) (holding 
that organization of “independent businessmen, free from such controls as an 
employer might exercise,” were not immunized from attempted monopolization 
claims because the labor exemption does not apply to “controversies upon which 
the employer-employee relationship has no bearing”), and Taylor v. Local No. 7 
Int’l Union of Journeymen Horseshoers of U.S. & Canada (AFL-CIO), 353 F.2d 
593 (4th Cir. 1965) (en banc) (holding antitrust labor exemption applies only “(1) 
if the parties to a dispute stand in the relationship of employer and employee and 
dispute some aspect of that relationship, or (2) if the employer-employee 
relationship of others is the crux of the dispute”). 
 185 See Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. City of Seattle, 2017 WL 1233181 
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 4, 2017) (preliminarily enjoining ordinance); Chamber of 
Commerce of U.S. v. City of Seattle, 2017 WL 3267730 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 1, 
2017) (dismissing case but leaving injunction in place pending decision in 
companion case); Clark v. City of Seattle, No. 17 Civ. 0382, 2017 WL 3641908 
*(W.D. Wash. Aug. 24, 2017) (vacating injunction); see also U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce v. City of Seattle, No. 17-35371 (9th Cir.) (docket on appeal); Clark 
v. City of Seattle, No. 17-35693 (9th Cir.) (docket on appeal). 
 186 See Harris & Krueger, supra note 153, at 16-17 (arguing that Congress 
should “craft an ‘independent workers exemption’ from any antitrust laws” but 
noting that “[a]nother option would be to simply include independent workers 
under the NLRA.”). 
 187 Cf. Andrias, supra note 11, at 43–44, 70 (summarizing a variety of proposals 
regarding labor law reforms in the midst of arguing that broad-based political 
organizing offers a more promising path than “the traditional NLRA approach”). 
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opportunity to choose for themselves which route is more 
promising. Extending the National Labor Relation Act’s protections 
to independent employees would not preclude them from seeking 
alternate organizational routes if they so choose. Lastly, because 
many Gig Economy companies set the prices at which workers’ 
services are offered to consumers through their platforms, there 
would be an elegant symmetry in allowing service-providers to 
collectively bargain with platform companies regarding the terms 
under which they will offer their services on those very same 
platforms.188 
3. Benefits Afforded to Independent Employees 
Companies that have grown to sufficient size should be 
encouraged and incentivized to provide independent employees 
with benefits derived from the economies of scale that accrue to such 
employers.189 Whether a company is of sufficient size might be 
measured by any number of metrics, such as revenue, profits, 
valuation, or number of workers. Certain provisions of the federal 
Affordable Care Act that phase in only for companies employing 
specified numbers of people provide one illustration of how this 
might be structured.190 
                                                
 188 See Paul, supra note 7, at 261 (arguing that “a consistent application of price-
fixing norms” requires that, so long as platforms are allowed to set prices, so too 
“service providers ought to be able to engage in collective action, including 
coordinating directly on the prices of their services or other elements of their 
bargain” with the platform). 
 189 See HARRIS & KRUEGER, supra note 151, at 16–17 (“There are potentially 
large efficiency advantages” to allowing Gig Economy companies “to pool their 
independent workers for the purpose of purchasing or directly providing or 
administering certain benefits for workers.”). 
 190 See Small Business Healthcare, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., 
https://www.sba.gov/healthcare (distinguishing between self-employed workers, 
companies with fewer than 25 employees, companies with 26-50 employees, and 
companies with more than 50 employees). The Affordable Care Act itself also 
demonstrates that the federal government remains capable of enacting legislation 
to help support workers in an economy in which fewer are able to obtain the 
benefits of traditional employment. See, e.g., Carbone & Levit, supra note 17, at 
1018–20 (explaining how “the declining relationship between employment and 
health insurance is one of the factors that made the ACA necessary in the first 
place”). Indeed, many Gig Economy companies recognize that the Affordable 
Care Act’s insurance markets for individuals undergirds their ability to build 
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Among the benefits that might be provided to independent 
employees, for example, are financial and tax services or 
procurement of various types of insurance. Because large companies 
can administer or arrange for such benefits more efficiently than 
smaller companies or individual workers, independent employees 
would benefit significantly from such an arrangement. The Gig 
Economy group Peers and the New York-based Freelancers Union, 
which is comprised of independent contractors who meet certain 
criteria, provide helpful models for the types of benefits that could 
be provided to all independent employees and how the provision of 
those benefits might be arranged.191 Indeed, the Freelancers Union 
has already partnered with Lyft and it advises Uber on how to create 
portable benefits for its drivers.192 
Rather than statutorily enumerate a specific list of benefits to be 
provided, that decision is best left up to the companies, their 
regulators, and their workers (possibly through union 
representation, as discussed above), based upon their particular 
                                                
businesses with large numbers of independent contractors. As venture capitalist 
Marc Andreesen has written, it is “perhaps the single biggest key enabler for the 
sharing/gig/1099 economy.” Evan McMorris-Santoro & Johana Bhuiyan, How 
Obamacare Drives the Sharing Economy, BUZZFEED NEWS (Oct. 14, 2014), 
https://www.buzzfeed.com/evanmcsan/how-obamacare-drives-the-sharing-
economy?utm_term=.apdzyDK4vQ#.ru2k6xWYrB; see also Lobel, supra note 
39, at 70 (arguing that “HealthCare.gov has become a human-resources site for 
the platform economy” because it “has made it easier for independent contractors 
to purchase insurance on their own”). 
 191 See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 39, at 72 (discussing Peers); Steven Greenhouse, 
Tackling Concerns of Independent Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/24/business/freelancers-union-tackles-
concerns-of-independent-workers.html (discussing the Freelancers Union); cf. 
Aloisi, supra note 78, at 680–82 (discussing several organizations providing 
services and resources to Gig Economy workers, as well as efforts to organize Gig 
Economy workers). 
 192 See, e.g., Lyft Partners with Freelancers Union, LYFT BLOG (June 30, 2014), 
https://blog.lyft.com/posts/2014/6/30/lyft-partners-with-freelancers-union; Chris 
Opfer, Lyft Retirement Program Could Be Model for Sharing Economy Benefits, 
BLOOMBERG BNA LABOR & EMP. BLOG (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.bna.com
/lyft-retirement-program-b57982064126/; Noam Scheiber & Mike Isaac, Uber 
Recognizes New York Drivers’ Group, Short of Union, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/11/technology/uber-agrees-to-union-
deal-in-new-york.html. 
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industries and business models.193 Variety among the benefits made 
available could become an important way for Gig Economy 
companies to differentiate themselves from one another as they 
compete for independent employees.194 To take but one example, 
some Gig Economy companies in the transportation sector might 
find that helping independent employees procure better terms for 
automobile insurance is a boon to their recruitment efforts as 
compared to competitors that do not make similar efforts.195 Indeed, 
Uber and Lyft already appear to compete on this basis.196 
Encouraging the provision of benefits that could vary by industry 
and company would likely lead to the opening of precisely the type 
of dialogue between independent employees and companies that 
many Gig Economy workers desire.197 
                                                
 193 But see Alana Semuels, Could a Tax Fix the Gig Economy, ATLANTIC (Nov. 
6, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/11/gig-economy
/544895/ (discussing proposals to implement taxes to fund specific benefits for 
gig economy workers). 
 194 See, e.g., Cherry & Aloisi, supra note 132, at 684 (“Some platform 
companies have provided benefits, including health insurance. Their hope is to 
stand out from other platforms and attract the most talented workers.”); In the 
Battle Between Lyft and Uber, the Focus is on Drivers, All Things Considered 
(Nat’l Pub. Radio Broadcast Jan. 18, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections
/alltechconsidered/2016/01/18/463473462/is-uber-good-to-drivers-it-s-relative. 
 195 There are good reasons to tie minimum insurance requirements to a 
company’s size. By definition, larger companies will be involved in more 
transactions, some of which will inevitably prove problematic, but they will also 
have a broader population of users across which the cost of insurance can be 
spread. Cf. Acevedo, supra note 42, at 30 (“The real reason we should consider 
imposing some sort of mandatory insurance obligation on platforms is that 
platform activity creates risks for society at large, and the costs associated with 
those risks should not fall solely on [the platforms’] suppliers.”). 
 196 See Edelman & Geradin, supra note 43, at 311–12 (“Transportation 
platforms like Uber and Lyft typically provide insurance, usually including 
significant coverage for passengers (often more than required for taxis), as well 
as some coverage for drivers.”). 
 197 See, e.g., O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1118–19 
(N.D. Cal. 2016) (including among the terms of proposed settlement creation of 
“a driver association as a means of ‘opening a dialogue between Uber and 
Drivers’”); Acevedo, supra note 42, at 33 (“[S]uppliers don’t consider themselves 
traditional Employees and don’t expect the traditional perks of that status” but do 
“want a recognition of their relationship with platforms that opens up the 
possibility of two-way engagement.”). 
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Allowing companies to provide varied benefits is also a natural 
result of the proposed test for determining whether a worker is an 
independent employee, as opposed to the traditional tests for 
determining employment status. As discussed above, many 
companies currently fear offering benefits to independent 
contractors because courts and regulatory agencies might interpret 
those benefits as a factor suggesting that the independent contractors 
are actually misclassified employees. A new test focusing solely on 
the control exercised and retained by companies over workers, 
rather than other economic aspects of their relationship, would 
empower companies to extend more benefits to non-employee 
workers than they believe they can safely do under current law. 
4. Separating Benefits from Hours Worked 
Independent employees would not be entitled to legal 
protections that are traditionally tied to the number of hours worked, 
such as minimum or overtime wages.198 This is necessitated by the 
simple fact that there is no way to conclusively measure when or for 
how many hours a Gig Economy worker is actually working and, 
more importantly, how many hours they are working for a particular 
company. Although some commentators have summarily argued 
that there is no difficulty tracking workers’ hours because Gig 
Economy platforms enable data gathering and analysis on an 
unprecedented scale,199 such arguments elide fundamental questions 
regarding what information can be gleaned from that data. While it 
might be trivially simple to track how long a worker is logged in to 
an app, that does not necessarily answer the question of how much 
time was spent working. 
To again take Uber as an example, an argument can be made that 
a driver is working for Uber while driving a passenger with whom 
they connected through Uber’s platform. On the other hand, is that 
same driver working for Uber when they do not have a passenger 
and are only logged in to Uber’s platform? And if so, is that true 
                                                
 198 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)(C) (2018) (setting national minimum wage 
of $7.25 per hour). 
 199 See Cherry & Aloisi, supra note 132, at 678; cf. Hanauer & Rolf, supra note 
141 (“The obvious solution to the explosion of part-time work—voluntary or 
otherwise—is to prorate the accrual of benefits on an hourly or equivalent basis.”). 
494 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 19: 443 
regardless of whether or not they are doing anything to actively look 
for or provide rides to passengers, such as driving through areas 
likely to contain potential passengers? Or if they are concurrently 
logged in to both Uber’s platform and that of a competitor, such as 
Lyft, using both to run simultaneous searches for passengers? Or if 
they are logged in while performing some other task entirely? 
The ability of Gig Economy workers to remain passively logged 
on to multiple platforms, coupled with their freedom to choose 
where, when, how, and even whether to provide their services to a 
given consumer with minimal (if any) managerial oversight 
combine to make it impossible to determine how many hours they 
can be said to be working for any given company or how to 
apportion their finite hours between the multiple tasks they might be 
simultaneously engaged in. And if hours cannot be effectively 
measured, it makes little sense to require employers to provide 
hours-based benefits. In other words, independent employees’ 
failure to qualify for hours-based benefits is a linchpin of the trade-
off they make for more flexibility and autonomy in their work. 
Moreover, a worker classified as an employee is not necessarily 
entitled to compensation for “on-call” or “standby” time even under 
current law. As the Supreme Court long ago recognized, a worker 
who is “liable to be called upon at any moment, and not at liberty to 
go away,” is “none the less on duty when inactive” because “their 
duty [is] to stand and wait.”200 Stated otherwise by the Grubhub 
court, in any given case the facts “may show that the employee was 
engaged to wait, or they may show that he waited to be engaged” by 
his employer.201 Accordingly, decisions involving Gig Economy 
companies have reached different results as to whether workers 
alleging they have been misclassified as independent contractors 
could pursue claims relating to the time spent in between gigs.202 
                                                
 200 Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 231 U.S. 112, 119 (1913). 
 201 Tan v. Grubhub, Inc. 171 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1008 (2016) (quoting Skidmore 
v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 137 (1944)). 
 202 See Grubhub, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 1008–10; Tan v. Grubhub, 2016 WL 
3743365, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2016); Lawson v. Grubhub, 2017 WL 
2951608, at *8 (N.D. Cal. July 10, 2017); Yucesoy v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 15 
Civ. 262, 2016 WL 493189, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2016); Razak v. Uber Techs., 
Inc., No. 16 Civ. 573, 2016 WL 7241795 at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2017). 
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These inconsistent results amply demonstrate the necessity of 
clarifying this area of law. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The binary categorization of workers as either independent 
contractors or employees has failed. Our persistent application of 
antiquated legal tests to distinguish between outdated types of 
workers presents stark problems for all involved. Companies 
struggle with how to structure their workforce, workers do not know 
the benefits and protections to which they are entitled, and the 
judiciary is left to resolve disputes without clear guideposts as it sifts 
through the muck. 
Rather than continue trying to force square pegs into round 
holes,203 this Article offers a new model by sketching the contours 
of a third type of worker: the independent employee. In particular, 
outmoded tests should be abandoned in favor of focusing solely on 
the amount of control exercised over a worker, defining independent 
employment as an intermediate category of work for those who are 
not as autonomous as independent contractors but who are also not 
subject to the same degree of instruction and supervision as 
traditional employees. This Article proposes a new legal regime in 
which independent employees would be entitled to many of the 
same protections granted to traditional employees, but who trade a 
degree of economic assurance for greater flexibility in setting the 
terms and conditions of their work. 
In outlining this vision, this Article nevertheless recognizes that 
there are infinite variations of independent employment which 
might be put into practice. Focusing on one possibility provides a 
foundation upon which others may build by further illuminating the 
benefits and pitfalls of revising our employment laws to better 
reflect the new types of work that have emerged in the modern 
economy. This Article does not endeavor to provide a definitive path 
forward, but, in light of the importance of the worker-
misclassification allegations threatening nascent companies and 
                                                
 203 See Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d. 1067, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
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business models, it aims to further this crucial conversation for the 
benefit of both companies and workers alike. 
